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Articles
Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter
By

LEAH CHAN GRINVALD*

Introduction
THE U.S. REPUTATION for litigiousness is so pervasive that it has
entered our cultural fabric: books and articles have been written
about it and a variety of popular media have satirized our infamy.'
There is a paradox, though. Statistics show that approximately only
2
three percent of all legal disputes are brought to the judicial system.
Of this three percent, only a small fraction of disputes are litigated to
a final decision. 3 How can Americans still be so litigious while simulta© 2015 Leah Chan Grinvald. Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law
School. B.A., The George Washington University; J.D., NYU School of Law. For their
helpful comments and conversations regarding this Article, the Author would like to thank
Gaia Bernstein, Christian Czychowski, Stacey Dogan, Pamela Edwards, Yan Fang, William
Gallagher, Jeffrey M. Gitchel, Paul Gugliuzza, Michael Meurer, Andrew Perlman, Lisa P.
Ramsey, Sandra L. Rierson, Jessica Silbey, and Alan White. The Author would also like to
thank all the participants at the various presentations of this Article: INTA's 2015
Academic Day Scholarship Symposium, Boston University School of Law's IP Law
Speakers' Series, the 14th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the CUNY
Law Faculty Workshop, and the 2013 New EnglandJunior Scholars' Workshop. Finally, the
Author would like to thank Dahlia Ali and Jordan Marciello for their excellent research
assistance, Suffolk University School of Law for their financial support, and the editors of
the University of San Francisco Law Review. Feedback is most welcome:
Lgrinvald@suffolk.edu.
1. See, e.g., Seinfeld: The Maestro (NBC television broadcast Oct. 5, 1995) (satirizing
Liebeck v. McDonald's Rests., P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (D.N.M. Aug.
18, 1994), vacated, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994)). In this episode of Seinfeld,
one of the main characters, Kramer, sues a local coffee shop for serving him coffee that was
"too hot," burning his stomach (because he had attempted to sneak the coffee hidden in
his waistband into a movie theater). Id.
2. See William M. Landes, An Empirical Analysis of Intellectual Property Litigation: Some
Preliminary Results, 41 Hous. L. REV. 749, 761 (2004).
3. See Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 585, 589 (2008); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67
*

VAND. L. REV. 375, 377 (2014).
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neously having fairly low per capita rates of lawsuits? 4 This Article suggests that the growing practice of resolving disputes through the use
5
of abusive cease-and-desist letters is the answer to this paradox.
Cease-and-desist letters are abusive when they contain a threat (implicit or explicit) of litigation if the target does not comply with the
letter's demands, as well as one or more of the following items: unnecessary legalese (including unsubstantiated statutory citations), demands for a settlement within a short time frame, demands for
immediate payment of some form of fees, and/or weak legal claims. 6
Based on this growing trend and the potential harms these letters
bring, this Article proposes that when abusive cease-and-desist letters
are sent to vulnerable populations, such as small businesses or individuals, a certain amount of policing is needed.
While there are no comprehensive statistics documenting how
many cease-and-desist letters are sent each year, there are strong indications of increasing frequency at least in the intellectual property
field. 7 For example, a recent qualitative empirical study evaluating experienced intellectual property attorneys found that almost all of the
interviewed attorneys handled the majority of their clients' disputes

4. See Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the
Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 456 (2004) (stating that current litigation
rates in the United States are not exceptionally high). The per capita rate of litigation in
the United States is similar to that of peer nations, such as England and Australia. Id.; see
also Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the Empirical
Literature Really Say., 80 TEX. L. RJv. 1943, 1981-82 (2002).
5. See, e.g., Eriq Gardener, How to Write an Effectively Nasty Lawyer Letter, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (July 18, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marty-singer-cease-anddesist-letter-350612 ("In the cutthroat world of Hollywood law, the pen can be mightier
than the sword. With litigation costs skyrocketing and court dockets clogged, a forceful
cease-and-desist letter is increasingly a much quicker and more effective weapon than the
sharp blade of litigation. But it is not without risks.").
6. See, e.g., Letter from Diane M. Reed, Attorney, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear
LLP, to Christopher J. Day, Law Office of Christopher Day (Sept. 4, 2009) (on file with
author) (requiring compliance with the listed demands within two weeks from date of
letter); Letter from Nat'l Football League to Ms. Thom, Fleurty Girl (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file
with author) (requiring compliance with the listed demands within nine days from date of
letter).
7.

See Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854-57 (2012) (discussing the rise in trademark bullying through
the sending of cease-and-desist letters); Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground:
Cease-and-DesistLetters, DMCA Notifications and PersonalJurisdictionin DeclaratoryJudgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 784 (2010) ("[Clease-and-desist letters are frequently utilized in disputes concerning intellectual property and represent an important feature of the
intellectual property law landscape.").
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through cease-and-desist letters.8 These same lawyers admitted that
where such letters are sent to small businesses or individuals, it was
often more effective to be "abusive."9 While the study participants do
not use the term "abusive," the manner in which they enforce rights
against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals, can be deemed abusive under this Article's definition.' 0 In addition, these lawyers also admitted that they tended to enforce claims
through cease-and-desist letters, even where the lawyers believed the
claims had little merit. " Further, the fact that state government and
legislative entities believe there is a current need to address the issue
of "patent trolls,"' 2 provides support for this growing trend.'1
Although there are a variety of influences spurring the increased
use of abusive cease-and-desist letters, four likely culprits are (1) the
exorbitant cost of litigation and its outcome uncertainty, (2) the lack
of legal consequences for sending such letters, and (3) the effectiveness of the letters. Litigation is expensive, and therefore, it is in the
intellectual property rights holders' best economic interest (even for
multinational corporations with large legal budgets) to try to and resolve disputes without resorting to litigation.1 4 Additionally, in certain
8.

William T. Gallagher, Trademark and Copyright Enforcement in the Shadow of 1P Law,

28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 453,481-82 (2012) (describing the phenom-

enon as "demand letter lawyering").
9. See id. at 478.
10. See id.; see also infta Part I.B (discussing four factors that create an abusive ceaseand-desist letter).
11. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 475, 481 (stating that one of the themes of the study
was the extent to which the participants enforced weak claims).
12. "Patent trolls" are typically defined as business entities that have obtained patent
rights for the sole purpose of obtaining licensing fees through coercion (such as threats of
litigation). See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, NAT'L ECON, COUNCIL & OFFICE OF
Sci. & TECH. POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND INNOVATION 3-4 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT]. The specific problems related to patent trolls have been extensively explored in academic literature and have also been

highlighted as an executive-level policy concern to the U.S. economy. See id. at 12-13;James
Bessen, Jennifer Ford & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 2
(Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011), available at http://www.bu.edi/

law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documen ts/Bessen-Ford-Meurer-no-I 1-45rev.pdf
("We find that NPE lawsuits are associated with half a trillion dollars of lost wealth to
defendants from 1990 through 2010 .... ").See also infra Part III.C.
Press Release, N.Y. Att'y Gen. Office, A.G. Schneiderman Announces
13. See, e.g.,

Groundbreaking Settlement with Abusive "Patent Troll" (Jan. 14, 2014), http://ag.ny.gov/
press-release/ag-schneiderman-an nounces-grotundbreaking-settlement-abusive-%E2%80%
9Cpatent-troll%E2%80%9D [hereinafter N.Y. Press Release].
14. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (citing Bruce Sewell, Intel's General Counsel, who estimates Intel's costs for dealing with patent infringement claims are around

three to five million dollars per year).
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areas of the law (in particular, in intellectual property law), the outcome of litigation is not easily predicted due to the uncertainties in
the applicability of some doctrines and their corresponding defenses. 5 Furthermore, the patchwork of regulation and laws that
could provide some deterrence for sending cease-and-desist letters is
ineffective. Currently, the American Bar Association (ABA) Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 16 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
newly enacted state laws, and consumer protection laws (as enforced
by state attorneys general or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC))
have the potential to police abusive cease-and-desist letters.17
However, this Article's review of these potential forms of regulation reveals severe limitations that allow abusive cease-and-desist letter
senders to virtually evade any form of legal consequence.' 18 Therefore,
abusive letters remain effective because the same incentives that encourage rights holders to send abusive cease-and-desist letters disincentivize the targets to fight back. Moreover, when abusive ceaseand-desist letters are sent to small businesses and individuals, it is almost certain that such targets will immediately capitulate. 19 The effectiveness of such letters is due to a confluence of three factors that
create a coercive settlement process-an abusive letter, asymmetrical
disputants, and certain characteristics of small businesses and
20
individuals.
This Article argues that more effective and coordinated tools are
needed to police abusive cease-and-desist letters. Specifically, the approach needs to directly address the characteristics of small businesses
and individuals in order to be successful. One such proposal is adopting federal or state legislation, similar to the recently passed statelevel, anti-patent troll legislation,2 1 but with a broader focus. This
'

15. See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REv. 625, 657-61
(2011) (identifying three factors that lead to the unpredictability of trademark infringement lawsuits).
16. As enacted by individual states.
17. See infra Part I1.
18. Id. One limitation includes the myopic focus on "patent trolls." See infra Part III.C.
19. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478 ("Q: Why go after the little guy? A: Ease. It's
easy often. You can often get them to roll over with a few threats and some sweet talk....
Threats means we'll sue your sorry little company if you don't stop."). See also William
McGeveran, FourFree Speech Goals for Trademark Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &

ENT. LJ. 1205, 1206-07 (2008) (noting that cease-and-desist letters are frequently effective); William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKEIEY TECH.
L.J. 1547, 1569 (2006).
20. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
21. See Patent Progress's Guide to State Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS, http://
www.paten tprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-state-
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"anti-abusive threats" legislation would provide targeted parties with a
cause of action against the sender of an abusive letter. The legislation
would provide for a "fast-track" resolution of the abuse claim by a
judge, as well as contain an attorneys' fee-shifting provision if the
sender's letter was deemed abusive. 22 With the potential for recovering attorneys fees and fast-track resolution, more attorneys would be
willing to represent small businesses and individuals on a contingency
fee basis. 23 Adequate representation would assist in overcoming this
population's inability to information-gather, as well as its susceptibility
to inducement. 24 Since adopting legislation may not be immediately
forthcoming, and since it does not combat all the characteristics of
this vulnerable population, this Article proposes supplemental, holistic measures that could also assist. These proposals include greater
involvement by state bar associations and the ABA through issuing a
formal ethics opinion regarding the direct applicability of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to abusive cease-and-desist letters. Additionally, this Article proposes that state attorneys general should more
aggressively interpret their current consumer protection laws to allow
them to take further action against senders of abusive cease-and-desist
letters.
Part I provides an overview of the cease-and-desist letter process
and defines this Article's use of the term "abusive cease-and-desist letter." Part II discusses the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that render them susceptible to these abusive letters. Part II
also conducts an analysis of the incentives that rights holders have to
send an abusive letter. Part II further examines the problems associated with sending abusive cease-and-desist letters, including philosophical concerns with coerced agreements. Part III examines existing
mechanisms that could serve to police abusive cease-and-desist letters,
including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and recently enpatent-legislation/ (last updated Apr. 17, 2015) (providing an interactive map of states
with different stages of anti-patent troll bills, showing that twenty-two states have signed
legislation into law).
22. See infra Part IV.A.4.
23. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 656-57 (citing small businesses and individuals' lack
of monetary resources as a hurdle to accessing adequate legal resources for intellectual
property disputes).
24. See Carrie Johnson, Rights Advocates See 'Access toJustice' Gap in the U.S., NPR (Mar.
10, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/03/10/288225649/rights-advo
cates-see-access-to-justice-gap-in-u-s (reporting on recent research conducted by Columbia
Law School's Human Rights Clinic showing that individuals with access to counsel fare
considerably better in civil legal disputes).
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acted state legislation, but ultimately concludes that such mechanisms
do not effectively regulate this legal gray area.
In response, Part IV provides a number of proposals, including
revised federal and/or state legislation aimed at curbing abusive
cease-and-desist letters for all types of legal actions. Part V proactively
addresses a number of concerns that may be raised in response to
these proposals, including the concern that implementing new legislation to combat abusive cease-and-desist letters may encourage additional litigiousness by plaintiffs' attorneys. However, Part V provides
suggestions to counter these concerns. This Article then briefly concludes that the problems in this area are serious enough to outweigh
the concerns.
I.

The Cease-and-Desist Letter Process

Private dispute resolution is not a new phenomenon. A number
of empirical studies from the latter part of the twentieth century show
that most disputes are negotiated privately, without recourse to the
judicial system. 25 The current statistics of per capita civil litigation in

the United States supports this conclusion: only three percent of all
civil disputes proceed to litigation, 26 and of this number, approximately one percent progress to a judicially-determined result. 27 Despite the actual statistics, the U.S. reputation for litigiousness

maintains its resonance. 28 This Article asserts that one of the answers
to the paradox of the U.S. reputation for litigiousness is the growing
trend of settling disputes through cease-and-desist letters, and in particular, the use of abusive cease-and-desist letters to coerce a private
settlement.

29

25. See DAVID M. TRUBEK, JOEL B. GROSSMAN, WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, HERBERT M.
KRITZER & AUSTIN SARAT, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT S-75-76 (University of Wisconsin Law School, 1983); Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims,
and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 525, 543 (1980-1981);
Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business:A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc. REV.
55, 61-62 (1963).
26. See Landes, supra note 2, at 761.
27. This statistic only encompasses federal district court civil cases for the twelve
month period ending September 30, 2013. See U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2013 tbl. C-4, available at http://www.uscourts.

gov/ uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/ 2013/appendices/ CO4Sepl3.pdf. But see Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6J.
EMP. LEGAL STUD. 111, 113 (2009) (suggesting a higher percentage goes to trial).

28. See supra note 1.
29. See infra Part III.C (providing "patent troll" cease-and-desist letters as an example
of this growing trend). See also infra Part I.B (defining "abusive" cease-and-desist letters). Cf
J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, ComparativeLitigation Rates 39-40 (Harvard John M.
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Although there are few statistics to prove this overall trend, Professor William Gallagher's empirical study of the enforcement of intellectual property rights by attorneys offers some support. 30 His
qualitative study of fifty-eight experienced intellectual property lawyers found that almost all conducted their dispute resolution by using
cease-and-desist letters, which typically resulted in a privately negotiated settlement.3 ' In fact, only five of these seasoned attorneys had
ever actually litigated more than three cases. 32 Additionally, more
than one-third of the participants had never brought a trademark or
3
copyright case to trial over the course of their careers. 3Further, these
participants admitted that where such letters are sent to small businesses or individuals, strategically it was often more effective to be
"abusive. '3 4 One of the study's conclusions was that the study participants routinely enforced "weak" claims without any perceived ethical
35
dilemma.
In addition, recent state governmental actions against "patent
trolls" 3 6 that send abusive cease-and-desist letters to small businesses
also provides evidence for the conclusion that abusive cease-and-desist
Olin Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 681, 2010), available at http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/Raniseyer_681.pdf
(suggesting
that America's reputation for litigiousness partly stems from the mishandling of securities
class action and mass tort lawsuits).
30. See generally Gallagher, supra note 8. In addition, a counter-factual is also helpful as
proof of the growing trend. See also Megan Garber, This Cease-and-DesistLetter Should be the
Model for Every Cease-and-Desist Letter, THE ATLANTIC Uuly 23, 2012), http://
www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/07/this-cease-and-desist-letter-shoud-bethe-model-for-every-cease-and-desist-letter/260170/#. It was speculated that this cease-anddesist letter will go down in history as the "most polite, encouraging and empathetic" letter
ever to be sent, and was a viral Internet sensation. Debra Cassens Weiss, Jack Daniel's Ceaseand-Desist Letter Goes Viral for Being Exceedingly Polite, A.B.A. J. (July 26, 2012), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/ack-daniels-cease-and-desistjletter-goes viral-for-be
ing-exceeedingly-poli/.
31. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 465, 481-82.
32. Id. at 465. Professor Gallagher excluded Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(TTAB) trials from counting as litigation since such trials are not conducted in person. Id.
at 465 n.52. The low number of surveyed attorneys having litigation experience could partially be due to the fact that some simply preferred a transactional practice-if cases did
not settle, some would refer cases to a more seasoned litigator instead of handling it themselves. Id. at 465 n.53.
33. Id. at 465. The range of the survey participants' experience in intellectual property enforcement ranged from five to forty years. Id.
34. While the study participants do not use the term "abusive," the manner in which
they enforce rights against low-resourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals
can be deemed abusive under this Article's definition. See id. at 478; see also infra Part I.B.
35. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496.
36. See sources cited supra note 12.
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letters have been on the rise. 3 7 For example, the state attorneys general in New York, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Vermont, have all taken
action against a notorious patent troll for sending abusive letters to
small businesses within their statesYs
While Professor Gallagher's numbers are restricted to a small
sample of intellectual property attorneys, and the governmental actions have been limited, there are enough anecdotes to support the
conclusion that the rise of abusive cease-and-desist letters are not limited to the intellectual property field.3 9 Unfortunately, abusive cease-

and-desist letters are most problematic when the letters target lowresourced entities, such as small businesses and individuals.
A.

Overview of the Cease-and-Desist Letter Process

The Internet has been one of the main drivers for the increased
use of cease-and-desist letters in legal dispute resolution. Potential violations of one's rights are easily discoverable with specialized software
or even by conducting a quick Google search. 40 This means that previously unknown violations of rights can now be detected, which causes
a dilemma for the party whose rights may have been violated by a
third party: Should they enforce their rights or ignore the purported
violation? One of the reasons for the overall rise in cease-and-desist
letters in some areas of the law, like intellectual property, is the misconception that rights holders need to enforce each and every single
41
perceived violation of their rights or they risk losing them.
The actual cease-and-desist letter process is fairly straightforward.
After discovering a perceived legal right violation, an individual or entity sends a letter to the violator, identifying the entity's rights and the
unlawful actions of the violator. The letter will demand that the viola37. These state-level governmental actions have been in the form of legislation for
"bad faith assertions of patent infringement" and state attorneys general actions against
certain patent trolls for sending abusive letters. See, e.g., 9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4195
(West 2015); N.Y. Press Release, supra note 13.
38. Julie Samuels, It's a Bad Week to be a Patent Troll: Big Updates from New York and
Nevegg, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/01/
its-bad-week-be-paten t-troll-big-updates-new-york-newegg.
39. See, e.g., Cease and Desist Letters, AiiovE, THE LAW, http://abovethelaw.com/tag/
cease-and-desist-letters/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) (showcasing abusive cease-and-desist
letters covering various legal claims).
40. See, e.g., BitMatch, S.A.F.E., http://www.safe-corp.biz/products-bitmatch.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2015).
41. Cf Devan R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confrontingthe Genericism Conundrum, 28
CAP.Dozo L. REV. 1789, 1833 (2007); 2J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:91 (4th ed. 2014).
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tor cease and desist in its actions. 42 Depending on the type of violation, the letter may demand additional actions be taken (i.e., removal
of defamatory language on a website) .4 - Additionally, the letter will
typically contain a threat, either implicit or explicit, that if the target
does not respond to the letter, the sender will investigate its legal remedies, which may include litigation. Upon receipt of the cease-anddesist letter, the recipient has a choice to either comply with the demands or fight back. 44 Compliance is typically achieved through entering into some type of settlement agreement, whether through an
affidavit of compliance by the target, or a more extensive negotiated
agreement. 45 Although there are no statistics available on the success
rate of cease-and-desist letters, anecdotally, it appears that the vast majority of disputes begin and end with the cease-and-desist letter, partic46
ularly where the letter is abusive.
There are two noteworthy aspects of the typical cease-and-desist
letter process. First, the cease-and-desist letter process is typically conducted between asymmetrical disputants. Although entities of all sizes
enforce their legal rights, it appears that the larger the company, the
more likely it is to initiate court action or arbitration. 47 The reason for
this is that well-resourced entities typically have the funds to either
hire outside legal counsel or maintain a staff of in-house attorneys. 48
42. There are a number of websites with template cease-and-desist letters. See, e.g.,
Cease & Desist Letter Templates, Examples & Sample Forms, THOMPSON HALi. SANTI CERNY &
http://thompsonhall.com/cease-desist-letter-template-example-sample-forms/
DOOLEY,
(last visited Mar. 16, 2015); Cease and Desist Letter Template, ROCKETLAWYER, https://
(last visited Mar. 16,
www.rocketlawyer.com/article/cease-and-desist-letter-template.rl
2015).
43. The violation can vary from defamation, harassment, breach of contract, to infringement of an intellectual property right. See Cease & Desist Letter Templates, Examples &
Sample Forms, THOMPSON HALL SANTI CERNY & Doo.EY, supra note 42.
44. Defending oneself against a claim of legal rights violations can involve formal legal actions, like filing for a declaratory judgment, or informal actions, like public shaming.
See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 631; see also Part III.B.1 (discussing declaratory judgment
actions). The use of public shaming can be successful, however, it requires certain factors
to be present for its success. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 666-67 (discussing the four factors
required for a successful shaming campaign against a trademark bully).
45. See, e.g., Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, Partner, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz &
Cohn LLP, toJeffBritton, Owner, Exit 6 Pub and Brewery LLC (Dec. 9, 2013) (on file with
author) (requesting written assurances of compliance to demands contained in letter);
Settlement Agreement, Estate ofJamesJoyce and Carol Loeb Shloss, Mar. 19, 2007, available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/Shloss%20Setlement%20Agreement.pdf
(settling copyright infringement claims).
46. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
47. FULBRIGHT &JAwORsKi LLP, SECOND ANNUAL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVEY: FINDINGS
8 (2005).
48. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 655-56.
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Second, as settlement is the typical outcome of cease-and-desist letters,
the whole process is conducted outside of the judicial system. This fact
raises the importance of non-judicially related laws and needed regulations in this area. However, there are currently no effective laws and
regulations for cease-and-desist letters, placing a great deal of discretion upon the senders to appropriately draft such letters and negotiate a fair settlement. 49 Unfortunately, there are a variety of incentives
that encourage sending abusive cease-and-desist letters in order to
guarantee a nonjudicial, or private, settlement. 50 Prior to discussing
these incentives, it is important to understand the elements that make
a cease-and-desist letter "abusive."
B.

Defining Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters

While not all cease-and-desist letters are abusive, an informal review of cease-and-desist letters posted on public websites reveal that
the average cease-and-desist letter is not a friendly, merit-worthy missive intended to encourage a non-adversarial or fair settlement. 5' Contained within almost all cease-and-desist letters is a threat of litigation
(either implicit or explicit). This threat alone does not cause the letter to be abusive; rather, it is this threat, combined with one or more
factors that create the abuse. This section will outline four factors that
can create an abusive letter, however, these factors are not exclusive
and the absence of one factor does not automatically mean a letter is
not abusive. Ultimately, it is the totality of the letter that determines its
characterization.
1. Inappropriate Legalese, or Other Harsh and Insulting Language
Lawyers often write using legalese or "lawyerly" language. 5 2 Using
legalese may be appropriate at times, such as when quoting from a
statute, 53 however, when communicating with non-lawyers, the legal
49. See infra Part III (discussing the ineffectiveness of current enforcement efforts).
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See, e.g., Cease andDesist Letters, ABOVE THE LAW, supra note 39 (showcasing abusive
cease-and-desist letters). This Article acknowledges that the letters that receive media attention are likely going to be reflective of extreme abuse, as to be deemed newsworthy.
52. "Legalese" is defined as "the specialized language of the legal profession that is
[usually] complicated and often unintelligible to an outsider." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L
DICTIONARY 1290 (unabr. ed. 1986).

53. Although some plain English activists would disagree with this. See Andy
Mergendahl, Legal Writing in Plain English as Culture War, LAWYERIST (May 11, 2013), http:/
/lawyerist.com/64667/legal-wriing-in-plain-english-a-culture-wa/
("[F]or a number of reasons, florid, complex writing strewn with legalese does a poor job of communicating,
whether the reader is a lawyer, judge, or layperson (like a client).").
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profession has come to find that legalese is not only unnecessary, but
often completely unwarranted. 5 4 For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires that disclosure documents are written in
"plain English," and urges the profession to push for clarity in drafting all documents. 5 5 Distinguishing between appropriate legalese and
inappropriate legalese is challenging; however, when a cease-and-desist letter is sent to a non-lawyer, this Article argues that using legalese
is always inappropriate. There is no reason to use legalese other than
as an intimidation tactic, and a cease-and-desist letter can easily convey its seriousness in plain English.
Additionally, inappropriate use of legalese also includes citing to
legal authority without referencing the substance of the law56 when
the letter is sent to a non-lawyer. 57 Similar to using Latin phrases or
lawyerly language, lawyers cite to laws in an attempt to provide legitimacy to the legal claims. This tactic is particularly useful where the
claims are meritless or weak. Where the letter is sent to another attorney, simply including a citation to the relevant law is warranted, as
attorneys have the resources to find the citation. However, where the
letter is sent to a non-lawyer, it is unlikely that the recipient will be
able to access the cited law or have the resources to hire a lawyer to do
so for them. 58 Therefore, legal citations without inclusion of the
source are simply an attempt at intimidating the target to capitulate to
the letter's demands.
While including a copy of the cited law in a cease-and-desist
makes sense where it is sent to a non-lawyer, critics may argue otherwise. Critics may argue that even when the sender attaches a copy of
the cited statute to the letter, it is unlikely that a non-lawyer target
would be able to interpret the law due to the complicated language
found in most statutes. While this criticism has merit, including a substantiated statutory citation gives the target the opportunity to read
and attempt to interpret the law (or find a friend or family member to
do so on their behalf).
54. See, e.g., Nora Rock, Five Good Reasons to Avoid "Legalese, " iRAcrcl PRO (Jan. 16,
2014), http://avoidaclaim.com/2014/five-good-reasons-to-avoid-legalese/.
55. See generally U.S. Si.c. & ExCH. COMM'N, A PLAN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO
CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998).
56. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 628. Including quotations, hyperlinks, or attachments of the cited statutory authority are all acceptable methods of referring to the law.
57. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, Partner, Jones Day, to Registrant of
www.kevynorr.com (June 10, 2014) (on file with author) ("Continued unauthorized use of
these marks constitutes, at a minimum, service mark infringement, service mark dilution,
and false description in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. and state law.").
58. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 648-49.
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Further, harsh or insulting language is also a contributing factor
to determining whether a letter is abusive. In fact, the dictionary defines "abusive" as "employing harsh or insulting language." 59 While
using insulting language is not frequently seen in letters containing
inappropriate legalese, it is important to note that harsh or insulting
language is never appropriate in a letter asserting one's legal rights. 60
2.

Demands for Quick Settlement

A demand to complete a transaction at once is the hallmark of a
coercive settlement and is arguably one of the most common traits of
abusive cease-and-desist letters. 6 1 For example, in Odorizzi v. Bloomfield
Sch. Dist.,62 the California Court of Appeal noted the fact that Mr.
Odorizzi was coerced into resigning his job because his employer demanded that he resign immediately, without time for reflection or
outside counsel, was an important factor in potentially voiding the
agreement. 63 Typically, an abusive cease-and-desist letter demands
that a target respond within a very short time frame, often between
three and fourteen days. 64 For example, one abusive letter stated,
"The complaint is prepared, and we will file it next week if we do not
receive an acceptable response from you [in five days]. '' 65 One week
does not provide a target with any meaningful time to find an attorney. Even if a target were to retain an attorney, this type of short time
frame does not allow the attorney to conduct a thorough analysis of
the claims or prepare a response letter by the stated deadline. 6 6 In this
situation, the only viable option for a target is to capitulate and accede
to the demands of the letter, regardless of the legal merits of the
claims.
59.

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 8 (unabr. ed. 1986).

60.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2013). A lawyer has the obliga-

tion to maintain "a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in
the legal system." Id.
61. The recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws also include this item as a factor in
determining a "bad faith" assertion of patent infringement. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 481703(2)(d) (West 2014).
62. 54 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
63. See id. at 541 (characterizing the demand as exerting undue influence).
64. See, e.g., Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57 (giving target three days
to respond); Letter from Anessa Owen Kramer, supra note 45 (giving the target two weeks
to respond).
65. Letter from Robert W. Payne, Attorney, LaRiviere, Grubman & Payne LLP, to
Michael Shkolnik (June 7, 2002) (on file with author).
66. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 648-49.
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While there is some value to the counter-argument that providing
a short time frame in a cease-and-desist letter is necessary to ensure
that a target takes the sender's demands seriously, other benchmarks
provide enough time for retention of an attorney, and for the attorney
to conduct a proper analysis and response. 6 7 For example, Rule 12 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a minimum timeframe
of twenty-one days for a defendant to respond to a newly filed summons and complaint. 68 The circumstances of a newly sued defendant
is similar to that of a cease-and-desist letter recipient-both need time
to retain an attorney, and the attorney needs time to draft a response.
Unlike cease-and-desist letter recipients, however, litigation defendants have an opportunity to request additional response time from the
court. 69 Because the cease-and-desist letter process is extra-judicial,
letter recipients do not have this ability. Therefore, a timeframe similarly given to litigating defendants, if not longer, is needed for the
cease-and-desist letter process, and any letter demanding anything less
than the standard twenty-one days should be considered abusive.
3.

Demands for Immediate Payment of Fees

Similar to demanding settlement within a short timeframe, a demand for immediate payment of fees within a cease-and-desist letter is
another factor that strongly favors characterizing the letter as abusive. 70 The type of fees demanded differs depending on the particular
claims. Some letters demand payment of licensing fees or attorneys'
fees, in addition to the target's capitulation, in order for the sender to
not file a lawsuit against the target. For example, the patent troll,
MPHJ Technology, routinely sent cease-and-desist letters to small businesses demanding a license fee between $900 and $1,200 per employee in order for the target to continue to use its scanning

67. For example, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) typically provides
trademark and patent applicants with six months to respond to an office action (a letter
from an attorney at the USPTO regarding the application). See MPEP § 710.01 (9th ed.
Mar. 2014).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). While a request for additional time from the court may typically be made after the opposing party denies an extension, the ability to request the court
for this additional time exists, and is not present in situations of cease-and-desist letters.
70. Also similar to the short time frame item, this item is also cited as a factor in
determining a bad faith assertion of patent infringement in the recently enacted state antipatent troll laws. See, e.g., IDAHO Com. ANN. § 48-1703(2)(d) (West 2014).
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technology. 7' In essence, the demand for fees in exchange for not
filing a lawsuit is akin to extortion, particularly where the sender of
the letter has no intention of filing a lawsuit. 72 Some states recognize

that extortion is actionable even where the threats are of unfounded
73
civil prosecution.
4.

Weak or Unreasonable Claims of Rights Violations

"Weak" or "unreasonable" claims of rights violations are easy to
identify at the extremes. For example, a claim alleging that a target
had used the accuser's trademarks to sell counterfeit products (but
were, in fact, advertising the resale of genuine products), is a weak
claim.74 Another example is a claim, which alleges trademark infringement by a company that began using the mark after the alleged
75
infringer.
Where weak or unreasonable claims become harder to identify
are borderline claims. These types of claims, at first, may appear
mildly plausible, but after applying the target's potential legal defenses, the claims become weak or even unreasonable. 76 For example,
Louis Vuitton sent a cease-and-desist letter to the University of Pennsylvania School of Law (the "Law School"), claiming that a flyer publicizing the school's symposium on Fashion Law infringed and diluted
Louis Vuitton's trademarks. 77 The flyer's background consisted of a
71. SeeJoe Mullin, Patent Trolls Want $1,000-For UsingScanners, Ars TECHNI CA Uan. 2,
2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/01/patent-trols-want-IO00-for-usingscanners/.
72. See ExtortionDefinition, DICtIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
extortion (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) ("[T] he crime of obtaining money or some other thing
of value by the abuse of one's office or authority.").
73. See, e.g., Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1136-37 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
74. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Micro Team, No. C 98-20164 PVT, 2000 WL 1897354,
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2000) ("Once the trademark holder sells his product, the buyer
ordinarily may resell the product under the original mark without incurring any trademark
liability.").
75. This is a weak claim because the alleged infringer would have "priority" under
trademark law. Priority in trademark law is usually determined by which party first uses the
mark in commerce. Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 909 (2015).
76. See Lara Pearson, Alex Butterman, Leah Chan Grinvald, Natalie Sulimani & Chris
Wheeler, 'Trademark Bullying'-Time to Get Some Clear Definitions, 44 WORLD TRADEMARK REv.
92, 94 (Aug.-Sept. 2013) (discussing the Louis Vuitton example).
77. See Letter from Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier, to Michael A. Fitts, Dean, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 29, 2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lv-letter.pdf. The language
used in the letter is insulting: "I would have thought the Penn Intellectual Property group,
and its faculty advisors, would understand the basics of intellectual property law and know
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design that was reminiscent of the famous "LV" logo, but had been
changed to "TM" and ,,©."78At first, Louis Vuitton's claims seem plausible, as Louis Vuitton and the LV logo are famous trademarks, and
the flyer's background clearly intended to evoke a connection to the
brand since the symposium's topic was fashion law. 79 Due to this superficial plausibility, an Associate Dean at the Law School requested
that the students immediately change the flyer.8 1 However, on closer
inspection of both the letter's claims and the Law School's use of the
LV logo, it became more apparent that neither a likelihood of confusion 8 ' was present, nor was the Law School using the mark for a commercial purpose.8 2 After the Associate General Counsel of the Law
School sent Louis Vuitton an explanation of its defenses, Louis Vuit83
ton dropped its claim.
Asserting weak or unreasonable claims establishes a cease-and-desist letter as abusive because it takes advantage of the legal system,
particularly when the sender knows its claims have little or no merit.
In such situations, the sender is unlikely to file a lawsuit against the
target, or if such lawsuit is filed, it is likely frivolous. 84 To effectuate its
better than to infringe and dilute the famous trademarks of fashion brands, including the
LV Trademarks, for a symposium on fashion law." Id.
78. See id. (including the flyer as Exhibit A).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (A) (2012) ("[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of
the goods or services of the mark's owner.").
80. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Michael Pantalony, Dir. of Civil Enforcement, Louis Vuitton Malletier (Mar. 2, 2012), available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/
penn.ogcletter.pdf (referencing the email sent by Steven Barnes, Associate Dean for
Communications of the University of Pennsylvania Law School).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (2012) ("Any person who . . . uses in commerce any
word, term, name, symbol... which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . . shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.").
82. See id. § 1125(c) (3) ("The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection . . . (C) Any noncommercial use of a
mark.").

83. See Letter from Robert F. Firestone, supra note 80.
84. For example, the troll, MPHJ Technology, sent initial cease and desist letters to
over 16,000 small businesses from December 2012 to May 2013. SeeJoe Mullin, Patent Stunner: Under Attack, Nation's Most Notorious "Troll" Sues Federal Gov't, ARs TECHNICA (jan. 14,
2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/patent-stunner-under-attack-nationsmost-notorious-troll-sues-federal-govt/. After over a year of threats, MPHJ filed its first actual lawsuit in November 2013. SeeJoe Mullin, Notorious "Scan-to-Email"Patents Go Big, Sue
Coca-Cola and Dillard's,Arts TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2014/01/notorious-scan-to-email-patents-go-big-stie-coca-cola-and-dillards/.
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demands, the sender depends on the target's desire to avoid the stress
of litigation (where the target is a well-resourced entity), or the target's fear and ignorance of litigation (where the target is a lowresourced entity, such as a small business or individual). 5
Unfortunately, a number of incentives motivate senders to distribute abusive cease-and-desist letters. 86 Where the targets of abusive
cease-and-desist letters are low-resourced entities, policy makers and
the legal community should be concerned about the effectiveness of
abusive cease-and-desist letters causing numerous de facto coerced
agreements, a reduction in marketplace competition, and an increase
in private censorship of speech.
II.

Characteristics, Incentives, and Problems

Some advocates of the private settlement process argue that
resolving legal disputes without litigation is beneficial because it reflects the projected outcome of a judicial trial without imposing costs
on society. 87 Litigation is expensive, particularly in the intellectual
property area. 8 8 Therefore, as a theoretical matter, private settlements
could be beneficial to society.8 9 However, this is not the case in situations of asymmetrical disputants. The argument that a private settlement merely projects the outcome of litigation is premised on a faulty
assumption of symmetrical bargaining power. 90 Disputes occur between and among parties of all sizes. Where there is economic or social disparity between the disputing parties, unregulated private
settlements are likely to be considered coercive and not beneficial to
society, as noted by Yale Law Professor Owen Fiss in his influential
Comment entitled, "Against Settlement." 9 1
85. See Mullin, supra note 71 (reporting that one targeted company acceded to the
demands of a patent troll without asking any questions in order to avoid conflict while it
was in the process of being acquired).
86. See infra Part II.B.
87. See Richard A. Posner, The Cost of Rights: Implicationsfor Centraland EasternEuropeAnd for the United States, 32 TuiSA L.J. 1, 2 (1996) ("The enforcement of legal rights consumes real resources, including.., indirect costs to the extent that rights are enforceable
against socially productive activities, or impose socially burdensome duties, or protect socially harmful activities.").
88.

See Am. INTL.L. PROi'. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SuRVEy 34-36 (2013)

[hereinafter AIPLA 2013 REPORT] (reporting that in 2013, costs associated with intellectual
property litigation ranged from $300,000 to $6,000,000, depending on the type of case and
value).

89. See generally Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371 (1986) (discussing the externalities to society from private litigation).
90. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984).
91. Id.
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Professor Fiss argues that three characteristics of low-resource litigants affect the settlement process, which increases the probability of
settlement: (1) an inability to information-gather, (2) a susceptibility
to inducement, and (3) an inability to finance the litigation. 9 2 Due to
these traits, Professor Fiss argues that private settlements are not appropriate because of the lack of judicial involvement in the process.9 3
Coupled with the incentives to send abusive cease-and-desist letters,
low-resourced targets are left vulnerable to a coercive settlement process that begins with an abusive cease-and-desist letter.
Coercion is considered an anathema in the law, and theoretically
coerced settlements are recognized as ineffective manifestations of
consent. 94 Practically, coerced settlements generated from abusive
cease-and-desist letters are detrimental to society because they reduce
market competition, and consequently, consumer choice. 9 5 Additionally, abusive cease-and-desist letters chill free speech and provide pri96
vate parties with a mechanism for censoring unfavorable speech.
A.

Characteristics of Small Businesses and Individuals

Although Professor Fiss's Comment primarily focuses on the
characteristics of low-resourced litigation plaintiffs, the same characteristics apply in the cease-and-desist letter process, where the concern
is on low-resourced targets, namely small businesses or individuals. As
stated above, these two populations share the same characteristics that
97
often lead to a quick settlement, regardless of the merits.

92. Id.
93. See id. at 1077-78.
94. REtSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim no
reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim."). See LON L. FULLER & MEtVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 292 (8th ed. 2006) ("It must, to constitute a
contract, appear that two minds were at one ..
") (quoting Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D.
463, 472 (1876)).
95. See Marcus Wohlsen, Patent Trolls are Killing Startups-Except When They're Saving
Them, WINED (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/09/patent-trols-versIs-start
ups/ (reporting on the lawsuit filed by 1-800-Contacts against Ditto, a small startup competitor). See also infra Part II.C.2.
96. See Rebecca Curtin, SLAPPing Patent Trolls: What Anti-Trolling Legislation Can Learn
from the Anti-SLAPP Movement, 18 STAN. TECH. L. Rav. (forthcoming 2015) (on file with
author).
97. See infra Part II.C.3.
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1. Inability to Information-Gather
Information regarding the legal aspects of a dispute, such as the
relevant laws and cases, is needed in order to effectively assess one's
chances of success in a legal dispute. Just as crucial, however, is the
non-legal information regarding the opposing party, such as the resources of the other party and the party's penchant for litigation. All
of this information should be assessed together to formulate a strategy
for the dispute (whether to send a demand letter, bring or defend a
lawsuit, settle, etc.). 98 For example, a party with a strong legal claim
facing an opponent without a litigious reputation should maintain a
strong negotiating position. However, if the opposing party is litigious
and well-resourced, then it may be more advantageous for the claimant to settle. But conducting effective information-gathering to obtain
this information consumes resources, particularly, financial resources,
of which a low-resourced entity likely has little.9 9 Therefore, upon receipt of a cease-and-desist letter, a small business or individual would
likely make a relatively uninformed decision to merely comply with
00
the letter's demands.
2.

Susceptibility to Inducement

For small businesses and individuals, a cease-and-desist letter may
not only be an ominous sign of expensive legal bills, but also an emotional firestorm. Over 78 percent of all small businesses in the United
States are sole proprietors. ") This means that for the majority of small
businesses, the only employee is the business owner herself. 0 2 Based
on this information, a cease-and-desist letter could be viewed as a personal attack on the business proprietor, rather than an impersonal
business interaction. For example, one small business owner who received a cease-and-desist letter from the National Football League
stated that the letter initially "scared the bejesus out of [her]."10 3 This
98. See Bret Rappaport, A Shot Across the Bow: How to Write an Effective Demand Letter, 35
J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIR. 32, 36-37 (2008).
99. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 649. While some small businesses may have business
insurance that could cover intellectual property infringement litigation, it is highly unlikely
that individuals (such as bloggers or artists) would have insurance coverage for such
claims. See id. at 649 n.141.
100. See generally Robert G. Bone, ModelingFrivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. Riv. 519 (1997)
(providing examples an explanations regarding this asymmetrical information model).
101. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 654.
102. Id. at 654-55.
103. Melinda Deslatte, "WhoDat' Shirts CAN Be Sold: NFL Clarifies Saints Gear Position,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/01/who-datshirts-can-be-sol_n_445291.html.
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leaves a small business or individual emotionally more susceptible to
inducement to settle the legal dispute privately.
3.

Follow-through

The appeals process is one aspect of the U.S. judicial system that
increases the costs of litigation. 10 4 Even if a party wins at the trial court
level, there are generally two levels of appeals that the case could go
through. 105 Even if a low-resourced entity is able to finance a lawsuit
through the trial court proceeding, it may not be able to follow the
case through on appeal. Additionally, once a lawsuit has begun, defendants at all stages have difficulty withdrawing without the consent
of the plaintiff (which often comes at a high cost, if at all). 106 Further,
the consequences for not defending oneself are harsh-default judgment. 07 This means that a low-resourced entity is likely to settle early,
even if it has a strong defense, as it would be unlikely to have the
funds to defend itself to the end of the litigation.
Based on these three characteristics, Professor Fiss argues that
private settlements between asymmetrical parties are inherently coercive and cautions against a wholesale adoption of rules that force parties to privately settle their legal disputes.' 08 This Article takes a more
nuanced approach to private settlements between parties with resource disparity, and argues that the three characteristics place lowresourced entities at greater risk for coercive settlements. However,
not all private settlements between unequal parties are necessarily coercive; instead, in the cease-and-desist letter process, it is the abusive
letter combined with the asymmetry and the three characteristics that
creates the coercion. The question then becomes one of why: Why
would someone want to send an abusive letter?
104. See Kim Tung, Reducing the Costs of Litigation:Appeals, PuB. LAw RESEARCH INST.,
http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/appeal.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
Tung's article poses the questions: "What is wrong with the appellate system?" and "Why
does it cost so much, but run so slowly?" See id.
105. See U.S. Court System, SYRACUSE UNIV. MAXWEI. SCH. OF CITIZENSHIP & PUB. AFFAIRS,
http://www2.maxwell.syr.edu/plegal/scales/court.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). Even if
the case is administrative, like an inter partes patent reexamination, the cost of seeing the
case through to appeals is quite high, relative to the initial costs ($50,000 versus $250,000).
AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 36.
106. Seegenerally FEn. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (1) (A) ("A defendant must serve an answer ..
(emphasis added).
107. FEn. R. Civ. P. 55(a) ("When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.").
108. Fiss, supra note 90, at 1075.
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Incentives

There are a number of economic, legal, and practical factors that
incentivize entities to knowingly send abusive letters to small businesses and individuals. Four notable factors are (1) the costs of litigation and (2) its uncertainty, (3) the lack of legal consequences for
sending abusive letters, and (4) the letter's effectiveness in obtaining
the desired outcome.
1.

Costs of Litigation

The economic costs of litigation have been widely discussed in
academic and policy literature. 10 9 Engaging in litigation is expensive
and time-consuming. For example, an average infringement lawsuit
for a patent valued at less than $1 million costs $350,000 to $700,000
to litigate, without accounting for any appeals. 1 0 Part of the expense
of litigation is the time it takes from initiation to verdict.I" One empirical study of federal courts found that the average length of a civil
lawsuit ranged from one to two years during the period of 1971-86.112
Generally, a sender of cease-and-desist letters is aware of these costs, as
it is oftentimes a target itself." 3
For example, Intel is both a major enforcer of its intellectual
property rights as well as a target of others' enforcement efforts. Intel
estimates that it receives between 100 and 150 cease-and-desist letters
per month from patent holders claiming that it infringes on their
rights. 1 4 Due to the high costs of litigation, rights holders have a
strong incentive to resolve disputes privately through cease-and-desist
letters.11 5 While the costs of privately resolving an intellectual property rights dispute are unknown, it is likely much less expensive than
litigation.' 16 Therefore, there is a high economic incentive for targets
to settle immediately upon receiving a cease-and-desist letter.
109. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 87, at 2; Kathleen Engelmann & Bradford Cornell,
Measuring The Cost of Corporate Litigation: Five Case Studies, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 377, 378-88
(1988); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinay Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1993).
110. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 34.
111. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 16 (1990) (discussing the concern regarding caseload
increases in federal district courts leading to delay and a consequent denial ofjustice to the
parties).
112. Id. at 20.
113. See Trimble, supra note 7, at 787 (discussing the following Intel example).
114. Id. (citing Intel's General Counsel).
115. See FULBRIGHT &JAWORSMK LLP, supra note 47, at 15 (listing intellectual property
disputes as one of the most costly types of litigation).
116. See id.
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Uncertainty of Litigation

In addition to the high costs of litigation, the uncertain outcome
presented by many types of claims is another incentive to send ceaseand-desist letters. Particularly, litigation outcomes in intellectual property disputes are hard to predict, even for seasoned litigators. The reason for this difficulty differs for each area of intellectual property. For
example, in patent cases, some of the uncertainty stems from the
claim construction that the district court adopts during a "Markman"
hearing," 1 7 whereas in trademark law, the uncertainty can stem from
the various defenses a defendant may have, or the strength of the
plaintiffs mark.' 18 Additionally, rights holders may be apprehensive
about enforcing a claim in court due to the court's ability to invalidate
intellectual property rights.'' Similar to the high costs of litigation,
outcome uncertainty incentivizes rights holders to ensure that they
privately settle with the targets of their letters.

117. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) ("[W]e see the
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to
allocate all issues of construction to the court."). See also Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9 LEWIS & CIARK L. RiFV. 93, 104 (2005)
("The early interpretation of the scope of a patent claim can be used for subsequently
deciding issues of both patent validity and infringement."); David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes
Early Victory Against Lowe's, SUFFOLK UNIv. LAW SCH. (June 4, 2014), http://
www.suffolk.edu/news/52901.php ("[C]laim construction defines the scope of the patent
and, in many cases, can greatly influence the ultimate outcome of the case.").
118. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 638, 660-61. The scope of trademark protection is
based on the strength of the trademark. Id. at 638. The stronger the trademark is, the
wiper scope of protection. Id.; see also E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d
1280, 1291 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The strength of a mark is determined by its placement on a
'continuum of marks from "generic," afforded no protection; through "descriptive" or
"suggestive," given moderate protection; to "arbitrary" or "fanciful" awarded maximum
protection."') (quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 605 (9th
Cir. 1987)). Compare Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs., Inc., 332 F.2d 534, 54041
(3d Cir. 1964) (holding that the "Family Circle" trademark was not strong enough to enjoin unauthorized third-party uses in product categories other than in the plaintiff's business of magazines), with The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Mgmt., Inc., 82 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1629,
1641-42 (T.T.A.B. 2007) (holding that "Arden B" was a famous trademark and the plaintiff
could enjoin third-party uses of the mark in product categories outside of plaintiffs
products).
119. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Snpp. 2d
445, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that plaintiff's trademark for its "Red Sole" was nondistinctive and ordering its cancellation), rev'd in part, 696 F.3d 206, 228 (2d Cir. 2012)
(overturning the district court's decision on non-distinctiveness, but limiting the trademark to where the Red Sole is contrasted with the outside color of the shoe).
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Effectiveness

While the empirical data on the effectiveness of abusive ceaseand-desist letters is fairly non-existent, anecdotal evidence emphatically supports the conclusion that abusive letters are effective particularly when they are sent to low-resourced entities, such as small
businesses and individuals. 12 1 The reason for such effectiveness is the
confluence of factors discussed above-the abusive language contained in the letter, asymmetrical disputants, and the characteristics of
the low-resourced entities1 2 '-that
creates a coercive environment
where the low-resourced entity has no choice but to accede to the
demands of the cease-and-desist letter. It is important to note that
abusive cease-and-desist letters are also effective when sent to wellresourced entities. This may be attributed to a number of factors, but
for some well-resourced entities, the costs (financial and human capital) of engaging in litigation may outweigh any benefit obtained by
receiving a favorable outcome.1 22 While abusive letters are problematic even if the disputants are in symmetry, this situation is not overly
worrisome because there is no coercion. Well-resourced parties are
able to information-gather in order to make an informed decision to
3
settle with an intellectual property rights holder.12

120. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 478.
121. See supra Parts I.B.1-4, II.A.
122. See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Recovery of Attorneys'Fees in Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation, 2 LANDSLIDE 14, 17 (May-June 2010) (concluding that since the possibility
of attorneys' fees may influence the decision to settle, attorneys need to take into consideration that attorneys' fee awards are a low likelihood in trademark litigation). Willingness to
settle is particularly the case in intellectual property law where judges have the discretion
to impose attorneys' fees on the losing party in "exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)
(2012). Imposing attorneys' fees is not the norm, and judges go out of their way to deny
such awards. See, e.g., Phillip Morris USA Inc. v. Lee, 547 F. Supp. 2d 685, 697 (W.D. Tex.
2008) (declining to award fees despite finding of willful infringement in context of award
of statutory damages); Reno Air Racing Ass'n v. McCord, 76 U.S.P.Q.D.2d (BNA) 1302,
1309 (D. Nev. 2004) (declining to award fees despite defendant's continued infringement
in violation of temporary restraining order), rev'd in part on other grounds, 452 F.3d 1126
(9th Cir. 2006). See also Davis, supra, at 14.
123. Furthermore, a well-resourced party may be able to negotiate a coexistence agreement depending on the claims of the intellectual property rights holder. See Marianna
Moss, Trademark "Coexistence" Agreements: Legitimate Contracts or Tools of Consumer Deception?,
18 Loy. CONSUMER L. Riv. 197, 199 (2005) ("In order to coexist in the market 'peacefully,'
companies with potentially infringing trademarks sometimes enter into coexistence agreements, which allow them to continue marketing their products to the public without the
fear of defending a trademark infringement lawsuit.").
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Lack of Legal Consequences

Due to its extra-judicial nature, abusive cease-and-desist letters do
not come within the purview of the legal protections against abusive
litigants, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11 sanctions. ' 2 4 Outside of the judicial sphere, abusive cease-and-desist letters
do not squarely fit within other regulatory schemes. One exception is
where a patent troll sends an abusive letter in bad faith. 1'2 5 This narrow situation directly implicates recent legislation passed by approximately twenty-two states, but as discussed in Part III.C, this legislation
26
would not assist where the abusive letter was sent in good faith.'
Aside from the narrow anti-patent troll laws, the only legal consequence for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters appears to be remote: the risk that the target files for a declaratory judgment action or
publicly shames the sender. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that a small
business or individual will be able to file a declaratory judgment action against a sender of an abusive cease-and-desist letter due to the
high costs involved. 12' 7 While public shaming is a low-cost alternative
to litigation and can be an effective bargaining tool, a number of variables contribute to its success.' 28 Therefore, shaming may not be available to all targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters. Additionally,
recent work on prospect theory and the endowment effect shows that
some senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters may not be rational
actors, and, as a consequence, are likely unshamable.' 29 As a result,
there are currently few, if any, direct legal consequences from sending
124. See infra Part III.B.2.
125. See PatentProgress's Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21.
126. See id. (identifying the following states as having passed legislation addressing bath
faith patent infringement assertions: Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-771 (a) (West 2014) ("A person shall not make a
bad faith assertion of patent infringement.").
127. See infra Part III.B.1.
128. Some of these variables are shared norms of a community in which the target of
shaming is a part, and the vulnerability to shaming by the shaming target. Grinvald, supra
note 15, at 666-68.
129. SeeJessica M. Kiser, To Bully or Not to Bully: Understandingthe Role of Uncertainty in
TrademarkEnforcement Decisions, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 242 (2014) ("Calling the trademarks 'crown jewels,' or viewing them as on par with tangible property, illustrates the tendency of trademark owners to elevate the status of trademarks to something more
significant than mere business assets. The inherent nature of trademarks lends itself easily
to the errors associated with the endowment effect. Since this psychological effect can impact rational decision making, it should be taken into consideration by anyone seeking to
deter trademark bullying.").
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an abusive cease-and-desist letter. While some forms of regulation
could police abusive cease-and-desist letters, it is necessary to understand the problems associated with abusive cease-and-desist letters.
C.

Why Are Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters Problematic?

This Article has established that cease-and-desist letters may lead
to coerced settlement agreements. 13 0 Coercion is problematic on
many different levels. Philosophically, coercion in a negotiation process invalidates any resulting agreement on moral grounds. 13 However, due to the characteristics of low-resourced entities, it is unlikely
that a coerced agreement would be invalidated-creating defacto enforcement. Economically, an agreement based on coercion is anticompetitive and reduces consumer choice in the marketplace. More

generally, abusive cease-and-desist letters are problematic because
they increase the power of private censorship by well-resourced
entities.
1. Coercion Invalidates
It is well-settled contract doctrine that coercion invalidates agreements.

132

The theoretical rationale for this is that coercion clouds the

free will and the thought process of the coerced party, such that the
consent given is invalid. 13 3 Under this reasoning, even if the choice
made by the coerced party is advisable or intentional, the choice is still
invalid because of the coerced party's inability to freely decide that for
herself.134 Abusive cease-and-desist letters sent to small businesses and
individuals are clearly coercive because the goal of an abusive letter is
to cloud the free will and thought process of the low-resourced recipient. The use of unnecessary legalese and unsubstantiated statutory citations are intended to confuse and intimidate the non-attorney
130. See supra text accompanying note 20.
131. See Claire Finkelstein, Contract Under Coercion: Should You Keep a Contract
with a Robber? 3 (Sept. 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at https://
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Contracts_UnderCoercionCFinkelstein_093010.pdf;
Mark
Fowler, Coercion and PracticalReason, 8 Soc. THEORY & PRAc. 329, 330 (1982).
132. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEx. L. RF'v. 717, 718
n. 1 (2005); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, andEconomic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603,
616-17 (1943).
133. See AlAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 8 (1987) ("[C]oercion compromises or negates
the voluntariness of an act ....");Hale, supra note 132, at 616 ("[W]here there exist
coercion.., there is no volition. There is no intention nor purpose, but to yield to moral
pressure, for relief from it.").
134. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596,
601 (1944).
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recipient of the letter. Additionally, the demand for immediate settlement within an unreasonable timeframe implies that no outside advisors would be allowed to provide support to the low-resourced entity.
Further, the demands provided in the letter approximate extortion. 135 The threat of litigation, combined with one of the other indicia of abusiveness,' 3 6 provides the low-resourced entity with a choice
of either complying or facing expensive litigation. This choice may
come down to the decision between staying in business or the value
received by keeping a secret safe. These options are not valid because
the damage that could ensue from the expensive litigation is much
greater than the perceived value of settling.
Some critics may argue that a low-resourced target should simply
enter into the coerced agreement and then subsequently bring a lawsuit to invalidate that agreement based on the coercion, such as in the
seminal cases Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co.' 3 7 and Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico.13 8 For example, in Totem

Marine, the plaintiff had previously entered into a settlement agreement with Alyeska Pipeline in order to avoid bankruptcy. After it was
able to financially stabilize itself, it brought a lawsuit against Alyeska
Pipeline to invalidate the earlier agreement. However, this is not a
viable option for many low-resourced entities. The inability of small
businesses and individuals to follow through on litigation means that
this population does not have the resources needed to defend or prosecute a civil lawsuit, and such legal action is needed in order to invalidate coerced settlement agreements. This inability results in a form of
defacto enforceability, which should be viewed as morally and legally
undesirable.
135. See David B. Parker & David D. Yang, Pre-LitigationDemand Letters: Assessing the Thin
Line Between Zealous Advocacy and Extortion, 32 L.A. CNrrY. BAR Assoc. UPDATE, Dec. 20t2,
http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=14413; Max Kennerly, When Does a Lawyer's
Demand Letter Become Extortion?, LITIGATION & TRIAL (July 19, 2013), http://www.litigation
andtrial.com/ 201 3/O7/articles/attorney/ demand-letter-extortion/.
136. See supra Parts I.B.1-4.
137. 584 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1978). In Alyeska Pipeline Ser. Co., the plaintiff previously
agreed to a settlement in return for a severe reduction in payment that was owed under the
prior contract. Id. at 18. The plaintiff agreed to the settlement because they needed the
quick infusion of cash, or else they would have gone bankrupt. Id. The court ruled that the
settlement agreement had been coerced under the doctrine of economic duress and invalidated the agreement, paving the way for the plaintiff to potentially recover the full amount
owed under the prior contract. Id. at 23-25.
138. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). Interestingly, the court in Alaska Packers'Ass'n did not
base its holding on the doctrine of coercion, but rather on the pre-existing duty rule. [d. at
103. However, the case has been re-explained by Professor Finkelstein in terms of coercion.
See Finkelstein, supra note 131, at 42-48.
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Anti-Competitiveness

Economically, abusive cease-and-desist letters sent to small businesses and individuals are anti-competitive and harms consumer
choice. In the marketplace, it is often the small businesses and individuals who provide competition to the established businesses in any particular industry, often by offering cheaper or cutting-edge alternatives.
For example, a dog toy company, Haute Diggity Dog, made chewable
dog toys called "Chewy Vuiton," that cost approximately $10, whereas
the trademark holder, Louis Vuitton, sold dog accessories costing approximately $1,600.139 Additionally, individual bloggers that write
product reviews or commentary aid small businesses in increasing exposure and further facilitate marketplace competition. 40 Cheaper, or
different, products, and candid reviews are helpful to consumers, as
they provide increased choice and information.
The effectiveness of abusive cease-and-desist letters results in a reduction in competition, particularly where the letter alleges a violation of intellectual property rights. Patents, copyrights, and
trademarks are often embedded within a product or service. Where
the abusive cease-and-desist letter requires a complete abstention of
future production or sales of a product or service or alternatively pay
an outrageous license fee, a low-resourced entity may choose to simply
discontinue the product. For example, the previously mentioned
Haute Diggity Dog's entire line of dog toys were parodies of famous
trademarks. When Louis Vuitton sued them for trademark infringement, the small business defended itself because, otherwise, in the
words of one employee, "we would have had to go out of business."' 4'
Unfortunately, even though practitioners acknowledge this anti-competitive aspect of intellectual property enforcement, it is often not ac42
tionable or successful under antitrust law.'
139. See Peter Lattman, "Chewy Vuiton" Beats Louis Vuitton, But Feels a Bite, WArI. ST. J.
LAW BLOG (Nov. 28, 2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/11/28/chewy-vuiton-beatslouis-vuitton-but-feels-a-bite/; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507
F.3d 252, 268 (4th Cir. 2007).
140. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and Its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AN) THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 409-10 (Graeme
B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008).
141. Lattman, supra note 139 (quoting a Haute Diggity Dog employee).
142. Grinvald, supra note 15, at 650 (stating that trademark bullying will not fall within
the purview of antitrust law because a trademark is unlikely to generate market power,
which is a main requirement for an antitrust cause of action). See also Michael Lipkin,
Lens.com's Antitrust Suit Against 1-800 Contacts Dismissed, LAw360 (Mar. 3, 2014), http://
www.law360.com/articles/514963/lens-com-s-antitrust-siit-against-1-800-contacts-dismissed
("U.S. District Judge David Sam dismissed Lens.com's suit with prejudice, following the
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4
Private Censorship1 3

A more general concern is the effect that abusive cease-and-desist
letters have on the freedom of low-resourced entities to express themselves. One example involves the blog, kevynorr.com, which criticized
the actions taken by Kevyn Orr, a former partner at the large law firm,
Jones Day, in handling Detroit's bankruptcy restructuring.1 44 The law
firm sent the blog an abusive cease-and-desist letter with the intent to
stop the negative criticism. 14 5 Such criticism, while perhaps hurtful to
Jones Day, serves an important function in our democratic society.
Had the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization,
not stepped in to provide free legal counsel to the blog owners, it is
likely that the criticism would have been taken down. 14 6 More common, however, is for the low-resourced target to simply end its speech
or censor itself ex ante. This results in an implicit authorization of private censorship, and where the targets are small businesses and individuals, regulation is clearly needed.

III.

Regulation of Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters?

Although cease-and-desist letters are typically private, there are a
number of regulations or statutes that could serve to police abusive
Tenth Circuit's decision last year in a related case that 1-800 Contacts' trademark claims
were not baseless.").
143. While private censorship is not inherently unconstitutional due to the lack of state
action, it is problematic in its own right. See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 444-49 (1990) (discussing the
public versus private action distinction). Intellectual property law's harmful effect on free
speech has been the topic of extensive academic discussion and the full range of
arguments is outside the scope of this Article. For more in-depth coverage see Lisa P.
Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095, 1162-64
(2003); William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REV. 49 (2008);
Ridgway, supra note 19, at 1571-78.
144. Joe Patrice, Biglaw Firm Throws Even Bigger Hissy Fit, ABOVE THE LAW (June 20,
2014), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/biglaw-firm-throws-even-bigger-hissy-fit/.
145. Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57; see also Daniel Nazer, EFF to Jones
Day: Don't be a Trademark Bully, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 24, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/06/eff-jones-day-dont-be-trademark-bully.
146. The blogger may have been coerced into taking down the site, as the cease-anddesist letter is very abusive. For example, it concludes with an ominous line, "Your conduct
will be closely monitored." Letter from Robert P. Ducatman, supra note 57. The letter was
also sent to the domain registrar and hosting service, GoDaddy.com. Id. Although
GoDaddy.com has no legal obligation to take down the domain name, Jones Day may have
hoped that GoDaddy.com believed it needed to take down the website to comply with the
safe harbor for internet service providers under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See Immunity for Online Publishers Under the Communications Decency Act, DIGITAL
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishersMEDIA LAW PROJECT,
under-communications-decency-act (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
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letters. These include legal ethics rules, judicial protections against
abusive litigants, state anti-patent troll legislation, and consumer protection laws.
A.

Legal Ethics Rules

All attorneys have a unique responsibility to maintain the integrity and competence of the legal profession 4 7 and are subject to the
particular ethical rules established by the state where they are
barred. 14 Almost all states implement rules that closely resemble the
American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct,149 thus analyzing the applicability of the Model Rules to policing
cease-and-desist letters adequately reflects state ethics rules. These
rules govern all aspects of an attorney's professional conduct, covering
behavior in interacting with a client, with the court, as well as with
non-client parties. If a lawyer sends a cease-and-desist letter, Model
Rules 3.1 and 4.4 should be implicated because both rules involve attorney interactions with a non-client.150 However, even if attorneys fol147.
148.

Canon 1 (2013).
L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAI. RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD 41 (2d ed. 1998).
149. See State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/miodel_
rLles-of-professional-conduct/alpha-list state-adopting-mode rules.html (last visited
Mar. 9, 2015). For the Model Rules themselves, see Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct: Table
of Contents, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.ainericanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibil
ity/publications/model rules ofprofessional-conduct/modelrulesof.professionalcon
ducttable-of contents.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr r. 3.1 (2013); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013). There are a number of other Model Rules that could potentially also
govern an attorney's conduct in sending a cease-and-desist letter. For example, Paragraph
9 of the Preamble, Model Rule 3.4 titled Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel, and
Model Rule 4.1 titled Truthfulness in Statements to Others. Paragraph 9 of the Preamble
includes in a lawyer's responsibility the duty to zealously represent one's client but also
maintain "a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the
legal system." MODEL RULES OF PROF'I CONDucT Preamble,
9 (2013). However, an indepth discussion of all of the Model Rules (including the Preamble) is outside the scope of
this Article. Instead, this Article will briefly analyze Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4, highlight the
main problems with each rule, and discuss the shortcomings with attorney ethical rules
overall as an effective policing mechanism for abusive cease-and-desist letters.
Some states, like California, have additional rules that implicate communications between attorneys and non-clients. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5-100(a) (2013)
(prohibiting California attorneys from threatening criminal, administrative, or disciplinary
charges to obtain an advantage in a civil dispute). Although Rule 5-100 applies to prelitigation behavior, the rule does not cover abusive cease-and-desist letters that threaten
civil litigation proceedings, as the rule only prohibits "criminal, administrative, or disciplinary charges." Id.
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
DEBORAH
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lowed both rules, concerning ambiguities and gaps in regulation still
exist.
1. Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 Are Insufficient Policing Mechanisms
a.

Model Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claim and Contentions

Model Rule 3.1 states, "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis
in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."' 15 ' This rule could be interpreted to regulate cease-and-desist letters that contain extremely weak or meritless claims. If all attorneys
adhered to this rule there would never be frivolous claims or lawsuits,
but in reality, there is a widespread understanding that the rules of
professional conduct do not effectively prevent attorneys from bringing meritless claims.' 52 Due to this, there are a number of other mechanisms that attempt to regulate attorney and litigant behavior, such as
various provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including
Rule 11, which penalizes attorneys and litigants for bringing frivolous
lawsuits. 153 Additionally, Model Rule 3.1 does not prohibit sending an
abusive cease-and-desist letter if it contains some legally meritorious
claims. 1 54 As such, there are other concerns with abusive cease-and-

desist letters, for example, utilizing unnecessary legalese or demanding a settlement within a short timeframe, which the Model Rules do
not address.
b.

Model Rule 4.4 Respect for Rights of Third Persons

The tide of Model Rule 4.4, "Respect For Rights Of Third Persons,"' 55 would seem to closely address the concern of preventing abusive cease-and-desist letters. The text of Model Rule 4.4(a) states, "in
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights
of such a person."' 156 However, the problem with abusive letters is that
MODFL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013).
152. See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless
Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) (discussing multiple instances where attorneys filed
meritless claims).
153. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11. See also infra Part III.B.2.
154. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (2013).
155. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.4 (2013).
156. Id.
151.
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their substantial purpose is to stop the infringing actions through coercion, with the threats of embarrassment as a means to obtain the
desired settlement. Furthermore, two of the three comments to Model
157
Rule 4.4 appear to focus the rule on the gathering of evidence;
therefore, the meaning of the term "burden" could be interpreted as
meaning burdensome discovery requests, rather than sending abusive
letters.
2.

Additional Concerns: Partisanship, Enforcement and Coverage

Notwithstanding the identified gaps in each of the Model Rules,
even if the rules could theoretically prevent almost all instances of
abusive letters sent by attorneys, there are at least three additional
concerns that prevent the Model Rules from being entirely effective:
partisanship, enforcement, and coverage.
a.

Partisanship

The first concern is with an attorney's ability to identify violations
of the ethical rules. Professor Andrew Perlman's recent article on
"partisanship," or the assumption that lawyers are capable of being
affiliated with one side of the matter while remaining sufficiently objective about their own conduct, persuasively shows that an attorney's
objective self-analysis as to whether she is following the ethical rules is
distorted. 158 For example, where an attorney discovers documents
that would be extremely detrimental to her client's case, that attorney
may not disclose those documents and further, may not believe she
has crossed the ethical line. Professor Perlman's article suggests that
attorneys may believe that they are following the rules, but in fact are
not, due to a lack of objectivity. 159 In the above example, the attorney
may believe that she is acting as a "zealous" and ethical advocate due
to her lack of objectivity. The concern with partisanship is that attorney ethical rules are mostly enforced through self-regulation. This
means attorneys themselves are in charge of deciding when they are
following the rules and will have a difficult time determining whether
they are complying in situations where the legal standard (e.g., the
meaning of a "meritless" cease-and-desist letter) is unclear. Additionally, attorneys have a duty to report ethical infractions of other attor157. Id. r. 4.4 cmts. 2-3.
158. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3).
159. Id.
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neys.160 The threat of being reported is assumed to have a deterrent

effect and limit unethical practices. 16 1 But Professor Perlman's article
casts serious doubt on this assumption, as unethical conduct is likely
62

to go undetected. 1
b.

Enforcement

The second concern is enforcement of the rules because enforcement is primarily through self-regulation. 163 The implications of partisanship are that another attorney receiving an abusive cease-and-desist
letter may not recognize the letter as abusive. 164 Notwithstanding partisanship, due to the characteristics of small businesses and individuals, it is unlikely that this population would have access to legal
resources to assist them in identifying abusive behavior. Additionally,
even where abusive behavior is identified by low-resourced entities,
knowledge of how and where to report attorney conduct is confusing.
State bar associations do conduct a certain amount of outreach education to local communities about attorney ethical behavior and attempt
to ease the burden of reporting by maintaining online reporting systems. 165 However, additional assistance is needed.
c.

Coverage

Finally, another concern of relying solely on the Model Rules to
police abusive cease-and-desist letters is that they do not cover letters
160. MoD. RULES OF PROF'L. CONnUcT r. 8.3(a) (2013) ("A lawyer who knows that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.").
161. See generally Christine E. Parker, Robert Eli Rosen & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, The
Two Faces of Lawyers: ProfessionalEthics and Business Compliance with Regulation, 22 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcS 201 (2009) (conducting empirical study into the ethical and legal compliance of lawyers and their clients).
162. See Perlman, supra.note 158, at 16-22 (providing examples of studies showing that
biases tend to cloud attorney's recognition of unethical conduct).
163.

But see MoDm.I RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 10 (2013).

164. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 31-32 (discussing the issue of "ethical fading,"
which are blind spots, particularly in light of the structures of modern law firms).
165. See, e.g., Lawyer Regulation, CA.. STATE BAR, http://calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Law
yerRegulation.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2015); Resolving Conflict With a New York Attorney: A
Guide to Attorney DisciplinaryProcedures in New York State, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, http://www.
nysba.org/CustomTemplates/SecondaryStandard.aspx?id=26561
(last visited Mar. 9,
2015); Client-Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP), Tix. STATE BAR, http://www.texasbar.com/
Content/NavigationMenu/ForThePublic/ProbemswithanAttorney/CAAP/default.htm
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015); File a ComplaintAgainst a Lawyer, WASH. STATE BAR AS'N, http://
www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/Discipline/File-a-Complaint-Against-a-Law
yer (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
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sent by non-attorneys. Although attorneys send the majority of ceaseand-desist letters on behalf of their clients, there are certain instances
when non-attorneys send letters. For example, the Chairman of Eastern Point Trust Company, a non-depository trust company, sent a
cease-and-desist letter to Mr. Money Mustache, a financial advice blogger, alleging tortious business interference, conversion, trade disparagement, defamation, trademark, and copyright violations made by a
post on its website. 166 The contents of the letter are abusive because it
threatens to pursue litigation with an extremely weak legal claim if the
demands are not met within five days. 16 7 The Model Rules would not
16
cover this letter because the Chairman is not a licensed attorney.'
Additionally, it is popular for large intellectual property rights holders
to have brand managers, typically non-attorneys, manage the enforcement of their trademark portfolio.' " While brand managers may
work in concert with an attorney to draft a standard cease-and-desist
letter, a non-attorney brand manager is not bound by any ethical
rules. Thus, even if Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 were effective in policing
abusive cease-and-desist letters sent by attorneys, these rules would not
cover all abusive letters.
B. Judicial Protection Against Abusive Litigants
The sender of an abusive cease-and-desist letter is similar to an
abusive litigant in that the sender is attempting to utilize the legal
system to coerce the target into yielding to its demands. As such, two
forms of protection against abusive litigants, the potential for declaratory judgment actions and sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, could apply to situations of abusive cease-and-desist letters.
1. Declaratory Judgment Actions
A declaratory judgment action allows the recipient of a cease-anddesist letter to file a lawsuit against the sender seeking to resolve any
166. Letter from Glen Armand, Chairman, Eastern Point Trust Co., to MrMoneyMustache.com (Feb. 6, 2014), available at http://www.mrmoneymustache.com/wp-content/
uploads/2014/03/kisstrust first bullshitletterjpg.
167. Id.; see also Tim Cushing, Company Fires Off Legal Threats To Site Owner Over ThirdParty Forum Post; SelfInflicted Damage Ensues, TrCHDIPT (Mar. 14, 2014), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20140313/0 7 4 05826562/company-fires-off-legal-threats-to-siteowner-over-third-party-forum-post-self-inflicted-damage-ensues.shtml
(discussing the tenuousness of the letter's claims).
168. See Cushing, supra note 167 (reporting that Glen Armand is not an attorney).
169. Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnectfor Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L.
R :v. 1491, 1529 (2012).
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legal uncertainty. 70 This allows targets to potentially resolve the controversy raised by cease-and-desist letters faster because they do not
have to wait to see whether or not the sender brings the threatened
lawsuit.1 7' Depending on the type of legal violation stated in the ceaseand-desist letter, this procedure is a valuable way to "clear the air" and
move forward with one's business or life. 17 2 Due to this ability, as well
as the central role intellectual property plays in some businesses'
products, declaratory judgment actions are frequently sought in pat73
ent disputes.'
However, the problem with declaratory judgment actions is that it
is still a judicial procedure that comes with the commensurate time
and expense of litigation. 74 This means that the characteristics of
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (a) (2012) ("In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States... may declare the rights and other legal relations
of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could
be sought.").
171. See Megan M. La Belle, Patent Litigation, PersonalJurisdiction, and the Public Good, 18
GFo. MASON L. REv. 43, 45 (2010) (stating that declaratory relief in patent cases are effective because the alleged infringer chooses the forum and controls the timing of suit). See
also R. Scott Weide, Patent Enforcement Deterrence: Liberal Assertions of PersonalJurisdiction in
DeclaratoryJudgment Actions, 65 UMKC L. REV. 177, 177 (1996) ("In many instances, the
filing of a declaratory judgment action gives the alleged infringer a significant strategic
advantage over the patent owner."); Homer Yang-hsien Hsu, NeutralizingActual Controversy:
How PatentHolders Can Reduce the Risk of DeclaratoryJudgment in PatentDisputes, 6 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 93, 96 (2010) ("The advantages of declaratory judgments for alleged patent
infringers are many.").
172. See Chester S. Chuang, Unjust Patents & BargainingBreakdown: When is Declaratory
Relief Needed?, 64 SMU L. REv. 895, 899-900 (2011) (noting importance of declaratory relief
to potential infringers because of substantial damage awards); Tejas N. Narechania, An
Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the "Sword" of State Sovereign Immunity in StateOwned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. Rtv. 1574, 1590 (2010) ("[D]eclaratory judgment actions
serve an important role in the intellectual property system . . . .") (internal quotations

omitted); Marta R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal
Circuit'sDecision in Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten International Co., 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 371, 384 (2010) ("Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act to
eliminate uncertainty in situations where one of the parties threatens to sue but does not
proceed ....
Congress was especially mindful of the problems presented in patent, trademark, and copyright infringement cases.").
173. Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography,85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1464 (2010) (stating that
in all jurisdictions outside of the Eastern District of Texas declaratory judgments accounted for 15.49% of patent suits filed in 2005). See also Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:Does GeographicChoice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. Rv. 889, 921 (2001)
(stating that declaratory judgments brought by the infringer accounted for 14% of all tried
cases in the dataset). Additionally Professor Megan La Belle's research in the area shows a
close link between the Declaratory Judgment Act and patent litigation. Megan M. La Belle,
Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEo. MASON L. REv. 41, 60-61 (2012).
174. See Donald L. Doernberg & Michael B. Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action and Expanded FederalJurisdiction While the Supreme
Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L. REv. 529, 531-32 (1989) ("A declaratory judgment action
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small businesses and individuals will continue to hinder this group of
disputants with an inability to follow through with litigation, and it is
unlikely that this population would be able to bring a declaratory
judgment action. Unlike in a regular lawsuit where a plaintiff may be
able to find a contingency-fee attorney, it is unlikely that a plaintiff's
attorney firm would be willing to take a target's declaratory judgment
case because the target is the one that is claimed to be in the wrong.
Further, even if a small business or individual has business insurance
that covers defending an action, the insurance policy would likely require the small business or individual to wait until the plaintiff initi75
ates a legal action in order to pay for the defense.
2.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

A number of Rules of Civil Procedure at both the state and federal level could potentially regulate abusive cease-and-desist letters.' 76
For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure intends
to prevent attorneys and their clients from bringing frivolous lawsuits. 177 Where there is a violation of Rule 11, either the court or a

litigant may bring a motion to sanction another litigant or their attorney.1 78 However, the problem with relying on Rules of Civil Procedure
to police abusive cease-and-desist letters is that courts cannot impose
sanctions until the litigation reaches the judicial system. For example,
Rule 11 only authorizes sanctions against attorneys or their clients for
representations made in court filings.179 As mentioned earlier, the
cease-and-desist letter process is mainly extra-judicial, and therefore, a
is designed to permit a party to obtain an 'authoritative judicial statement of the legal
relationships,' regardless of whether a coercive legal or equitable remedy is sought.")
(quoting Frank M. Gilliland, Jr., Note, Federal Question Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the
DeclaratoiyJudgment Act, 4 VAND. L. REV. 827, 830 (1951)).
175. Eliot M. Harris, The Duty to Defend: What Insurers,Insureds and Their Counsel Need to
Know When Faced with a Liability Coverage Dispute, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/youngjlawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice-series/duty.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2015). Most business insurance policies contain a "duty to defend," which
protects the insurance policyholder in cases where a lawsuit is filed against her, not the
other way around. Id.
176. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2015); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2015); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.70.160 (West 2015).
177. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c). However, only attorneys can be sanctioned for violations of
Rule 11(b) (2), which requires an attorney certifies that the "claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law." FED. R. Cxv. P.
II(b)(2); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(5) (A).

179.

FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

Issue 31

POLICING THE CEASE-AND-DESIST LETTER

judge would never be involved to sanction the sender of an abusive
cease-and-desist letter. Additionally, even where litigation arises based
on an abusive cease-and-desist letter, it is likely that an abusive letter
would still not be subjected to regulation by Rule 11, as it is not a
court filing, but rather a private communication between the parties
sent prior to litigation.S 0
C.

State Anti-Patent Troll Legislation

The problems concerning abusive cease-and-desist letters and
abusive litigation in the patent area received national attention a few
years ago with the increase in what has been termed as "patent troll"
litigation. I8 ' The term "patent troll" refers to the practice of some business entities of purchasing patents without the intention of practicing
the invention contained within the patent (also referred to as nonpracticing entities or patent assertion entities).182 Instead, the reason
for purchasing the patent is to simply enforce its rights against unauthorized users to extract licensing fees:' 83 Although patent law implicitly authorizes entities having no intention to practice the invention to
acquire patents, this form of patent enforcement became problematic
when patent trolls began filing multiple lawsuits against targets, clogging up the court dockets. 1 84 However, it was not until patent trolls

180. See id. Sometimes abusive cease-and-desist letters are entered into evidence in a
civil litigation, but oftentimes it is simply to buttress a claim of notice or to fight against
personal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. See Athletic Training Innovations,
LLC v. L.A. Gear, Inc., No. 10-1524, 2010 WL 4103309, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2010)
(holding that an abusive cease-and-desist letter, when sent to plaintiff and its customers,
supports a finding of personal jurisdiction over defendant). Additionally, even where senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters are subject to judicial scrutiny, the likelihood of a
judge issuing sanctions is fairly slim. Manta, supra note 7, at 860.
181. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 Hous. L. REv. 325, 327-28
(2012).
182. Id.; see also Colleen Chien, Presentation to the DOJ/FFC Hearing of PAEs: Patent
Assertion Entities (Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=2187314. Not all non-practicing entities (NPEs) purchase their patent portfolio. Some NPEs, like universities, have organic patent portfolios from their research departments. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP". MEDIA &

Err. L.J. 611, 612-14 (2008) (answering the title's question in the negative, and terming
universities as non-practicing entities).
183. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
ColuM. L. REV. 2117, 2126-27 (2013) (describing these entities as "patent aggregators").
184. See Chien, supra note 182 (finding that in 2012, patent assertion entities filed 61%
of all patent infringement lawsuits).
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began to target small businesses and individuals that the problem
85
reached executive and legislative attention.
A number of different bills were introduced in Congress to combat the problem of patent trolls, but all have been stalled. 186 In response to the congressional inaction, a wave of "anti-patent troll"
legislation began to take hold at the state level in 2013. As of the date
of this Article, there are approximately twenty-two states with this type
of legislation. 8 7 Each state's legislation differs slightly, but at the core
of each statute is a prohibition on sending a bad faith assertion of
patent infringement through cease-and-desist letters.8 8 Determining
a "bad faith assertion" is factor-based, and each statute contains similar factors, such as lack of disclosure of the patent in the letter (or
failure to provide the information once requested), and demands for
payment. 8 9 While these statutes are a step in the right direction, their
applicability is limited to bad faith claims of patent infringement.
Therefore, state laws only provide limited coverage, and would not
185. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (noting that small businesses are
frequent targets of patent troll demand letters); Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls,
17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 464-65 (2014) (finding that 40% of small businesses had been
targets of patent troll cease-and-desist letters for using technology provided by another
party); Catching Up on ... Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC's Litigation Activities, ESSENTIAL PATENT

BLOC, (Jan. 3, 2013), http://essentialpatentblog.com/2013/01/catching-up-on-innovationip-ventures-llcs-litigation-activities/ (reporting on Innovatio's use of Broadcom's patents to
sue businesses such as restaurants, coffee shops, hotels, and grocery stores that use wireless
internet).
186. See Patent Progress's Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS,
http://www.patentprogress.org/paten t-progress-legislation-guides/paten t-progresss-guidepatent-reform-legislation/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2015);Joe Mullin, Anti-Patent-TrollBill Stalls
in Senate, But Reformers Remain Hopeful, ARs TECHNICA (Apr. 10, 2104), http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2014/04/anti-patent-troll-bill-stalls-in-senate-but-reforme rs-remain-hope
ful/. However, none of the bills attempt to address letters sent by patent trolls, just litigation behavior. See, e.g.,
Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. § 299A (2015) (proposing to
add a new section to the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299A, that recognizes the abusiveness of
demand letters, but does not sanction the letters themselves rather the litigation stemming
from such letters).
187. See Patent Progress's Guide to State Patent Legislation, supra note 21 (providing an
interactive map of states with different stages of anti-patent troll bills).

188. See, e.g.,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-1703 (West 2014). The state statutes refer to the
cease-and-desist letter as a "demand" letter. Some of the statutes provide a definition of a
"demand" letter to include a "letter, email or other communication asserting or claiming
that the target has engaged in patent infringement." See, e.g., id. § 48-1702.
189. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1903 (West 2014). In addition, many states include discretion for the court to consider other factors when determining the bad faith
nature of the patent infringement claim. See id. But see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West
2014) ("A patent notification shall contain all of the following ....If a patent notification
lacks any of the information required . . . the target may notify the person who made the
patent notification that the patent notification is incomplete.") (emphasis added).
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prohibit abusive cease-and-desist letters containing claims of other
types of violations. Additionally, the text of the statutes contains limitations. 190 For example, some statutes, like those in Wisconsin, focus
on the disclosures contained in the cease-and-desist letter, rather than
on the abusiveness of the demands. 19 1 This means that savvy senders
of abusive cease-and-desist letters can easily escape any legal consequences by complying with the statute's disclosure provisions.
D.

Consumer Protection Law

A final potential source of regulation for abusive cease-and-desist
letters is federal and state consumer protection law because sending
abusive cease-and-desist letters can constitute an unfair and/or deceptive trade practice. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has the authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act to
bring enforcement actions against entities conducting unfair and/or
deceptive trade practices.1 92 At the state level, each state attorneys
general office enforces the state's version of the "unfair and deceptive
practices" act. I9"Some abusive cease-and-desist letters come under the
ambit of consumer protection laws, particularly where they contain
deceptive statements or false threats of litigation. 91 4 In fact, recent enforcement actions taken by the FTC and the Attorneys General of New
York, Nebraska, and Vermont, against the "scanner troll,"195 MPHJ
Technology Investments, LLC, shows the ability of consumer protection laws to regulate the senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters. 1'6
190.

A systemic review of the state laws are beyond the scope of this Article. For coverANDREW S. BALUCH, PATENT REFORM 2014: A Com-

age of all forms of patent reforms, see

PREHENSIVE GUIDE TO CURRENT PATENT REFORM DEVELOPMENTS IN CONGRESS, THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH, THE COURTS AND THE STATES (Mar. 24, 2014), available at http://

www.foley.co/files/Publication/4969911 f-42ea-4566-90c9-3fa620d12f91/Presentation/
PublicationAttach men t/6ec9626b-2190-4aI 1-9d51-425adec351 fO/Paten tReform2014. pdf.
191. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.197(2) (West 2014).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
193. See CAROLYN L. CARTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT
ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 6 (Feb. 2009), availableat https://
www.ncc.org/images/pdf/udap/report 50_states.pdf.
194. PreparedStatement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n on DiscussionDraft of PatentDemand Letter
Legislation Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce 3-4 (May 22, 2014) (statement of Lois Greisman, Assoc. Dir. Div. Mktg. Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n) [hereinafter Statement of Lois Greisman].
195. See Samuels, supra note 38 (describing MPHJ technology as the "scanner troll").
196. SeeVermont v. MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-170, 2014 WL 1494009
(D. Vt. Apr. 15, 2014); MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, No. 6:14-cv11, 2014 WL 189831 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2014) (initiating a lawsuit against FTC for its
investigations of MPHJ); Activision TV, Inc. v. Pinnacle Bancorp, Inc., No. 8:13CV215,
2014 WL 197808 (D. Neb. Jan. 14, 2014); N.Y. Press Release, supra note 13.
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However, a severe limitation of utilizing consumer protection
laws as the sole means to police abusive cease-and-desist letters is that
few letters will meet the criteria for enforcement efforts by the FTC or
a state attorney general. The reason the FTC and a state attorney general could take action against MPHJ Technology was because of the
extreme number of small businesses it threatened, and the deceptiveness it used in attempting to coerce license fees.' 97 But other wellknown patent trolls, such as Innovatio, have escaped similar FTC and
state attorneys general enforcement actions despite undertaking actions similar to MPHJ Technology, but not in the same deceptive manner. 8 Therefore, where senders of abusive cease-and-desist letters
sufficiently disclose their claims and do not target thousands of small
businesses in any one particular state, the senders will likely escape
legal liability.
In conclusion, there does not appear to be any one regulatory
mechanism that fits the concerns posed by abusive cease-and-desist letters. The Model Rules potentially come the closest, but gaps in protection still exist within the rules, and they also do not cover all senders
of abusive cease-and-desist letters. Additionally, without a serious
threat of enforcement, the rules themselves cannot be effective. Moreover, although the recently enacted state anti-patent troll laws are a
step in the right direction, they are too narrow in scope as they specifically attempt to cover abusive patent cease-and-desist letters. Further,
actions taken by the FTC and state attorneys general against MPHJ
Technology under consumer protection laws are another potential avenue for regulation, but currently the actions appear to be limited to
extreme situations where the sender conducts a deceptive and widespread enforcement campaign. Finally, a more theoretical concern
with each of the various forms of potential regulation is that they do
197. MPHJ utilized a dizzying array of shell companies to represent itself, leaving the
target unable to speak to a person about the claims contained in the abusive letters. See
MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC, 2014 WL 1494009, at *1-2 (describing the process by which
MPHJ operated).
198. Innovatio, or the "wifi patent troll," sent numerous abusive cease-and-desist letters
to small businesses for infringement of its wifi patents. Daniel Nazer, Infamous Wi-Fi Patent
Troll Settles for Peanuts,TROU.ING EFFECTS (Feb. 7, 2014), https://trollingeffects.org/blog/
infamous-wi-fi-patent-troll-settles-peanuts. Attempting to protect its customers, Cisco and a
number of other equipment manufacturers brought an action against Innovatio alleging
RICO (fraud and racketeering) conspiracy. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig.,
No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012 WL 8500139, 1 (N.D. I11.
Oct. 1, 2012). Cisco's RICO claims were
dismissed and it eventually settled with Innovatio for 3.2 cents per user. See Thomas F.
Cotter, Judge Holderman's RAND Ruling in In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, COMPARATWE PATENT REMEDIES (Oct. 3, 2013), http://comparativepatentremedies.

blogspot.com/2013/10/judge-holdermans-rand-ruling-in-in-re.html.
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not address any of the characteristics of small businesses and individuals that contribute to the coercive settlement process. Therefore,
mechanisms need to be implemented that could better assist with policing abusive cease-and-desist letters that specifically target the characteristics of this vulnerable population.
IV.

Proposals to Police Abusive Cease-and-Desist Letters

This Article's proposals attempt to attack the problem of abusive
cease-and-desist letters from both sides of the dispute, sender and target, with the goal of creating a non-coercive settlement environment
for small businesses and individuals. First, on the sender side, the proposals attempt to reduce the incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters by altering the incentives that create an environment ripe for
abusive letters. Second, on the target side, the proposals aim to provide mechanisms that assist small businesses and individuals in overcoming the characteristics that leads to a coercive settlement process
in asymmetrical disputes. While none of the proposals individually are
a panacea for the problems of abusive cease-and-desist letters, they are
an important first step in encouraging the serious and non-coercive
enforcement of legal rights.
A.

Legislative Action

The first proposal is for Congress and/or states to provide a new
cause of action for "abusive threats" similar in nature to the previously
discussed state anti-patent troll laws, as well as borrowing some procedural advantages from state anti-SLAPP laws. 199 Before discussing the
elements of this new cause of action, it is important to note the objectives of this proposal and its limitations. The objectives of this proposal are to reduce the incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters and
assist small businesses and individuals. The goal is not to hamper good
faith efforts to enforce valid legal rights, but rather, to provide a noncoercive and more equalized platform for parties of all sizes to enforce their rights and negotiate a fair settlement. Providing a new
cause of action for abusive threats would accomplish this goal in two
ways.
First, the cause of action attacks the incentives that rights holders
have to send abusive cease-and-desist letters. As discussed in Part II,
the major incentives for sending abusive cease-and-desist letters include a lack of legal consequences for the action, and the letter's ef199.

See supra Part III.C. See generally Curtin, supra note 96.
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fectiveness in obtaining the desired outcome. Without any real
possibility of legal consequences, rights holders are incentivized to
send abusive letters because they are low in cost. It is more rational for
a sender to first send an abusive cease-and-desist letter, and then subsequently analyze whether actually pursuing litigation would be advantageous. Implementing a cause of action for abusive threats that
carries serious financial risks for the sender of an abusive letter creates
the possibility for greater accountability and would likely result in
rights holders recalibrating their enforcement tactics.
Second, the anti-abusive threats law would attack two of the three
characteristics that cripple small businesses and individuals in an abusive cease-and-desist letter process: the inability to information-gather
and susceptibility to inducement. This would be done by providing
small businesses and individuals the ability to recover damages, attorneys' fees, and legal costs. These remedies would allow small businesses or individuals to more easily retain attorneys on a contingency
fee basis. 20 0 With an ability to retain an attorney, a low-resourced target of an abusive letter would be able to information-gather because
the attorney would advise the small business or individual on the
strength of the claims contained within the letter, as well as the target's relative rights. While an attorney may still advise the lowresourced target that a settlement is preferable, 20 1 the decision would
be informed, rather than one made through coercion. Additionally,
an attorney could curb some of the emotional inducement frequently
experienced by low-resourced targets through counseling and
education.
However, this cause of action would not be a panacea to the
problems associated with the abusive cease-and-desist letter. For example, the new law would not attack the systemic problem of expensive
litigation. Similarly, the new law would not cover the general overenforcement of legal rights by Americans and, in particular, by U.S.

200. Contingency fee arrangements assist low-resourced entities in obtaining legal representation. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 231, 243 (1998).
201. For example, when Matt Nadau of RockArt Brewery (a small brewery in Vermont)
faced a potential legal battle with Hansen Beverages, his lawyer explained the risks of fighting back against a large corporation and ultimately advised him to settle. See Matt vs. The
Monster-2011 Bronze Telty, GREEN RIVER PICTURES, http://www.grpny.com/index.php/
about-us/awards?videoid=41738861 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
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intellectual property rights holders. 20 2 Instead, this new law will provide modest and incremental assistance to low-resourced targets.
Although this Article does not suggest specific language for the
proposed cause of action, it does take the position that developing a
cause of action should be enacted statutorily, rather than solely
through the courts. The need for uniformity and certainty in the law
support this position. In recent years, judges have become more "textualist" with respect to interpreting statutes and defenses to violations,
particularly with respect to federal intellectual property laws.2 0 3 If a

cause of action or defense is not explicitly stated within the statute,
textualistjudges would likely rule against the claimant. 2114 Further, certainty that a court accepts suits brought by targets of abusive ceaseand-desist letters would assist in making contingency fee attorneys feel
more comfortable that their client would not face an uphill battle.
This Article broadly envisions three elements to bring an "antiabusive threats" cause of action: (1) there is an allegation of a legal
rights violation; (2) that is abusive; (3) made to a specific target. All of
these elements would need to be met within the first cease-and-desist
letter sent to the target in order for the letter to be actionable. This
limitation should assist in protecting good faith enforcers of legal
rights who encounter targets that attempt to provoke abuse. 2 15 However, standing to bring this cause of action should not only be limited
to the recipients of the abusive letter, but by any person who is ag20 6
grieved by such a letter.
202. Over-enforcement is a problem of private enforcement of legal rights by intellectual property rights holders, and is the topic of separate research by this Article's author,
along with co-authors Eric Goldman and Deborah Gerhardt.
203. See Michael Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a
"Formalist"Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 897, 927 (2009).

204. See, e.g., ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 482 F.3d 135, 165 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that
despite a compelling policy argument, the court would not recognize the "famous marks
doctrine" in trademark law because it was not explicitly written into federal trademark
law).
205. For example, David Thorne, a comedian and author, provokes abusive behavior
by publishing his emails and letters in books and on his website. See generally DAVID
THORNE, THE INTERNET IS A PLAYGROUND: IRREVERENT CORRESPONDENCES OF AN EviL ONLINE

(2011); 27B/6, http://www.27bslash6.com/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2015). Mr.
Thorne received a cease-and-desist letter from Penguin Books Ltd. (the publisher of his
first book) for the artwork displaying a penguin with its finger raised printed on the cover
of his second book. See DennisJohnson, Penguin is Not Amused, MELVILLE HOUSE (Mar. 26,
2012), http://www.mhpbooks.com/penguin-is-not-amused/. As can be seen from the series of emails and letters, Mr. Thorne is purposefully provocative. Penguin, 2711/6, http://
www.27bslash6.com/covers.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
206. This is similar to the United Kingdom's remedy for groundless threats of infringement proceedings. See, e.g., Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 70(1) (Eng.) ("Where a person ...
GENIUS
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1. Allegation of Legal Rights Violation
One of the deficiencies identified in Part III.C with respect to the
recently enacted anti-patent troll legislation was that the laws only
dealt with bad faith claims of patent infringement. However, abusive
letters claiming legal rights violations occur across all areas of the law.
For example, a number of cases in California courts concerning abusive letters deal with the misuse of company funds and prior sexual
conduct.2 0 7 Aside from the political and media attention that "patent
trolls" have garnered, there does not appear to be a reason as to why
other types of intellectual property rights or other legal rights are exempt from the requirement of good-faith enforcement. 20o
2.

Abusive Letter

Determining abusiveness is challenging, as is seen from the discussions surrounding the abusive letters in California referenced
above. 209 Although multi-factor tests are often problematic, 2 ) this Article favors a non-exclusive factor approach in discerning abusiveness
to give courts an appropriate amount of discretion. Additionally, the
threatens another person with proceedings for any infringement of a patent, a person
aggrieved by the threats (whether or not he is the person to whom the threats are made)
may.., bring proceedings in the court against the person making the threats."); Trade
Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(1) (Eng.) ("Where a person threatens another with proceedings for infringement of a registered trade mark ... any person aggrieved may bring proceedings for relief under this section."); Registered Designs Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6,
c. 88, § 26(1) (Eng.) ("Where any person ... threatens any other person with proceedings
for infringement of the copyright in a registered design, any person aggrieved thereby may
bring an action against him."); Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 253(1)
(Eng.) ("Where a person threatens another person with proceedings for infringement of
design right, a person aggrieved by the threats may bring an action against him.").
207. See, e.g., Malin v. Singer, 159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (involving
allegations of embezzlement); Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2006) (involving allegations of sexual misconduct).
208. Patent trolls have garnered national attention, whereas other abusers of legal
rights have not, such as copyright trolls and trademark bullies. However, the harms caused
by these other types of abusers are similar in nature to patent trolls. See Matthew Sag,
Copyright Trolling, An Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. Rv. 1105, 1107 (2015).
209. In Malin v. Singer, the California district court found that the attorney (Martin
Singer) had sent an abusive letter, while the appellate court reversed. Malin v. Singer, No.
BC466696, 2011 WL 6070271 (Cal. Super. Nov. 29, 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 159 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 292, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). In Flatley v. Mauro, the California courts held that
the attorney's letter (sent by Mauro) was abusive and amounted to extortion as a matter of
law. Flatley v. Mauro, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 472, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 139 P.3d 2, 24
(Cal. 2006). Commentators have been attempting to reconcile the two holdings. See Kennerly, supra note 135; Parker & Yang, supra note 135.
210. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAIF. L. REv. 1581, 1614-15 (2006).
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non-exclusive factor approach allows for changes in social norms that
necessarily inform this type of analysis. The factors specified in Part
I.B are examples of non-exclusive factors that could be adopted to
determine when a cease-and-desist letter is abusive, but other factors
may be relevant, depending on the type of legal claim asserted. 21' Finally, only the first communication sent to the target would be examined for abusiveness. This limitation would safeguard against
targets that attempt to utilize the new cause of action to goad the legal
rights holder into sending an abusive letter. A number of wellresourced individuals enjoy provoking rights holders to see if they be2 12
come abusive out of frustration.

3.

Made to a Target

This last element is worded broadly in order to afford many different types of targets standing to sue an abusive sender. Senders can
target a wide range of different entities other than the alleged violator, such as the alleged violator's customers, distribution network, or
supply chain. 21 3 At times, it may be more efficient or economical for a
rights holder to threaten the supply chain or customers of an alleged
violator, rather than the actual infringer. 21 4 For example, the patent
troll Innovatio, targeted the customers of Cisco and other router manufacturers with its cease-and-desist letters. 21 5 Although Cisco and
other manufacturers brought a declaratory judgment action against

Innovatio on behalf of its customers, 2 16 other entities may not be so
proactive and they will likely need to give into the cease-and-desist
letter.

211. See supra Part I.B (listing inappropriate legalese or other harsh or insulting language, demands for quick settlement, demands for immediate payment fees, and weak or
unreasonable claims of rights violations as potential factors to determine abusiveness).
212.

See supra note 205.

213. See Grinvald, supra note 169, at 1526-31
frameworks for abusive rights holders).
214.
215.
185.

(discussing effective enforcement

See id.
See Catching Up on .

.

. Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC's Litigation Activities, supra note

216. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC, Patent Litig., No. 1:11-cv-09308, 2012 WL
1 (N.D. I1. Oct. 1, 2012); see also Mark Chandler, Innovatio Case: Victory for Cisco
8500139,
Customers Makes the Case for Patent Reform, Cisco BLOCS (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://
blogs.cisco.com/news/innovatio-case-victory-for-cisco-customers-makes-the-case-for-patentreform.
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Procedural Elements

In addition to the substantive elements, there are a number of
procedural elements that need to be implemented that are crucial to
assisting low-resourced targets. First, the burden of proof of whether
the letter is abusive would be on the letter sender. Second, fast-track
status would be given to such lawsuits filed by abusive letter targets,
21 7
similar to the special motions to strike filed under anti-SLAPP laws.
Finally, if a court found a letter abusive, it would award damages, attorneys' fees, and legal costs to the target. Each of these elements will
be discussed in turn.
a.

Burden of Proof

An important part of the anti-abusive threats cause of action
would be having the burden on the sender of the letter to prove that
the letter is not abusive. 218 One main reason for this requirement is
that the party who bears the burden of proof in civil litigation also
bears the costs of producing evidence needed to resolve the dispute. 21 9 Letter senders, unlike targets, are in the best practical and
economical position to provide evidence to prove the information
contained in the letter, why it chose to send the letter to the target,
and the reasoning behind the letter's settlement demand costs or
timeframe. Since the sender wrote the letter, it presumably has easy
access to all the evidence needed to satisfy its burden of proof. Thus, it
is more cost-effective for the sender to bear the burden, and it reduces
the costs of bringing an anti-abusive threats cause of action for the
220
target.

217. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(0 (West 2015) (requiring the court to
schedule a hearing on an anti-SLAPP motion no more than thirty days after the service of
the motion).
218. The burden of proof is an extremely important element of civil litigation, as who
bears the burden oftentimes influences the outcome. Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading
and Proof in DiscriminationCases: Toward a Theory ofProceduralJustice, 34 VANn. L. REv. 1205,
1207 (1981) ("[T]he allocation of the burdens of proof during trial often has a significant
effect on the outcome of a case and frequently may be dispositive.").
219. Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof 25 VANn. L. Riv. 1151,
1153 (1972) ("On each issue in a case some party must carry the burden of producing
evidence or lose at the hands of the judge . .

").

220. Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic
Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUO. 413, 418-19 (1997) (providing an economic model demonstrating the optimal allocation of the burdens of proof in civil litigation).
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b.

Fast-Track Status

The length of litigation is a major contributor to its high cost. In
2012, the average hourly billing rate of an attorney employed by a
private law firm in the United States was just under $400.221 The
longer a legal dispute runs, the higher the legal bills. Implementing a
"fast-track" status for anti-abusive threats lawsuits would attempt to alleviate some of the costs associated with a lengthy court case. The
known expense of litigation is one of the elements contributing to the
increasing use of cease-and-desist letters for legal dispute resolution,
and granting fast-track status could make going to the courts more
attractive. Additionally, high litigation cost is a factor that places lowresourced targets in a coercive situation with well-resourced letter
senders, and a knowingly quick judicial resolution would assist in overcoming the imbalance of power. Fast-track status would require a
judge to schedule a hearing within a short timeframe after the defendant files a response. 222 The notion of a fast-track status is not new:
California's anti-SLAPP law requires a judge to schedule a hearing on
the special motion within thirty days from service. 2 23 Other commentators have also proposed similar types of mechanisms to expedite
cases involving low-resourced entities, such as specialized small claims
courts.

c.

224

Damages, Attorneys' Fees, and Legal Costs

The type of remedies available for a cause of action plays an im22' 5
Alportant strategic role in determining whether to bring a case.
though most causes of action allow a winning plaintiff to recoup
221. See AIPLA 2013 REPORT, supra note 88, at 49.
222. See Steven P. Aggergaard, Three State-Based Defenses to Consider, FOR THE DEFENSE,
Apr. 2012, at 16, 18, available at http://www.bassford.com/newsevents-pressrelease-0412spa.pdf.
223. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(f) (West 2015).
224. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Departmentof Commerce Releases Worthless Report on Trademark
Bullying, TECH. & MKTc. LAW Bi.OG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2011/04/department of c.htm. Additionally, Professor Irina Manta has suggested that the USPTO act in an oversight capacity to assist in these disputes. Manta, supra
note 7, at 866-71. Further, the USPTO requested comments as to whether the United
States should establish a small claims proceeding for patent cases. See Request for Comments on a Patent Small Claims Proceeding in the United States, 77 Fed. Reg. 74,830 (Dec.
18, 2012).
225. For example, attorneys routinely strategize dispute resolution options based on
the types of remedies involved. See Davis, supra note 122, at 14 ("[Mlost parties to lawsuits
eventually decide to pursue or to settle their claims based on a cost-benefit analysis.").
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damages, recovering attorneys' fees and legal costs is less typical. 2 26
This is due to the "American rule" that requires each party in litigation to bear its own costs. 2 27 However, certain types of litigation need

incentives, or must at least be made easier to bring. Some courts recognize this need and allow for fee-shifting. 228 Bringing an anti-abusive
threats action should be encouraged, and implementing fee shifting
provisions is critical because it may convince risk-adverse attorneys
into taking on these cases.
The ability to bring a preemptory action against an abusive letter
sender would assist in altering the incentives and overcoming some of
the characteristics plaguing low-resourced targets. While the proposed
anti-abusive threats law would not directly attack the problem of the
over-enforcement of legal rights, with serious legal consequences at
stake for over-enforcing one's rights, it is likely that potential abusers
would adopt a more appropriate approach to their legal rights enforcement efforts. However, due to the limitations of an anti-abusive
threats law, additional measures are needed to fully address the
problems facing low-resourced targets.
B.

Greater Involvement by Bar Associations

In addition to the proposed anti-abusive threats law, greater involvement by state bar associations is needed in order to curb the incidences of abusive cease-and-desist letters. The ABA and state bar
associations are in a good position to assist in this effort because attorneys write the majority of cease-and-desist letters. As previously discussed, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not explicitly
cover the problem of abusive letters. 22 9 Additionally, even if the rules
explicitly prohibited abusive cease-and-desist letters, concerns with
partisanship and the ability to objectively assess ethical violations
would continue to exist.230 Although state bar associations are aware
226. However, it is becoming more typical. See Rebecca Friedman, The Lodestar Ranger:
CalculatingAttorneys' Fee Awards in Perdue v. Kenny A., 5 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PuB. Poi.'y
SIDEBAR 58, 62-63 n.31 (2009) (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 913 (3d ed. 2002)) ("More than 180 federal statutes and 4,000 state

statutes authorize awards of attorneys' fees.").
227. SeeAlyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (recognizing the "American rule"). See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee
Shifting: A CriticalOverview, 1982 DuKE LJ. 651, 651 (1982).
228. For example, in civil rights litigation this has been termed the "private attorney
general" situation. See La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afj'd, 488
F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See supra Part III.A.2.a.
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of these problems, there is more that could be done to encourage and
educate attorneys to self-regulate this specific form of problematic
behavior.
First, the ABA or state bar associations could issue formal ethics
opinions stating that the Model Rules prohibit sending abusive ceaseand-desist letters. This would help clarify the applicability of the rules
to this practice and hopefully reduce the incidences of attorney-written, abusive cease-and-desist letters. Second, state and local bar associations should conduct educational programs for its members on
the particular issues that arise when dealing with low-resourced targets
of cease-and-desist letters in order to help with the problem of partisanship. Finally, local bar associations should provide enhanced outreach to low-resourced targets to specifically educate them on how to
handle cease-and-desist letters, which could assist in overcoming their
inability to information-gather and in overcoming their susceptibility
to inducement.
1. Formal Ethics Opinion Interpreting Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to Prohibit Abusive Cease-andDesist Letters
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
and state bar associations sometimes issue formal ethics opinions interpreting applicable ethical rules. 23' These opinions range in topics,
from interpreting the rules prohibiting sexual relations with clients to
those allowing attorneys to communicate with clients through unencrypted email. 23 2 State bar associations often address similar topics as
the ABA. 233 Although these ethics opinions are not formally binding,
23 4
they are quite influential.
231. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 468 (2014)
(interpreting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONPUCT r. 1.17 (2013)); Cal. State Bar Standing
Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 12-0007 (2014) (interpreting CAL.
RUI.ES OF PROF'L CONnucTr r. 3-100, 3-700(B) (2) (2013)).
232. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992) (discussing sex with clients); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413
(1999) (discussing protecting the confidentiality of unencrypted email).
233. For example, in 2006, the ABA released a Formal Opinion on when "puffing" is
appropriate in negotiations, and the California State Bar Association released a similar
formal opinion in 2014. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06439 (2006); Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal
Op. 12-0007 (2014).
234. See Lawrence K. Hellman, Wen "EthicsRules"Don't Mean What They Say: The Implications of StrainedABA Ethics Opinions, 10 GEo. J. LEGAi. ETHICS 317, 325-26 (1996).
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As discussed in Part III.A, Model Rules 3.1 and 4.4 do not explicitly prohibit legal rights enforcement through the use of abusive
cease-and-desist letters. While there are formal ethics opinions that
discuss related areas, the lack of a formal ethics opinion directly on
the topic of abusive cease-and-desist letters leaves a gap in regulation.
For example, ABA Formal Opinion 94-383, "Use of Threatened Disciplinary Complaint Against Opposing Counsel," interprets the Model
Rules to prohibit attorneys from threatening to file disciplinary
23 5
charges against an opposing counsel in order to coerce settlements.
Where an attorney threatens to file a disciplinary charge, but has no
actual intent to do so, this behavior is interpreted to violate Rule 4.1,
which requires a lawyer to be truthful in dealings with others on a
client's behalf.23 6 While this formal opinion appears to address the

prohibition of abusive letters generally, it is directed specifically at the
use of an unrelated disciplinary action to coerce settlement. Abusive
cease-and-desist letters contain threats that are related to the legal violation claims alleged in the letter. A formal ethics opinion that clarified that Model Rules 3.1, 4.4, and 4.1 prohibited attorneys from
sending abusive communications to adverse parties would assist in
bringing awareness to this issue.
While attorneys are aware of their ethical obligations to not allege
weak or unreasonable legal rights violations, many are likely unaware
of the additional requirement to be non-abusive. 237 Unfortunately, it
has become the norm in the legal profession to include abusive tactics
and legalese to blanket cease-and-desist letters with a posturing air of
seriousness or authority. 238 A formal ethics opinion unambiguously
stating the "do's" and "don'ts" of cease-and-desist letters would clarify
that the ethical obligations require attorneys to be non-coercive in private settlements. While this would help stem the incidences of abusive
letters by changing the norms of the cease-and-desist letter process,
problems associated with partisanship would still exist because attorneys would still be placed in situations where they are supposed to be
advocating for one side, and therefore may not be objective judges of
ethics.
235.

See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-383 (1994).

236.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2013).

237. However, recognition of an ethical rule does not translate into full compliance.
See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 496.
238. See The Mechanics of Ethical and Effective Cease and Desist Letters, SMITH & HOI'EN,
http://www.smithhopen.com/litigation-cease and-desist-letterstrategies.aspx (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (categorizing abusive cease-and-desist letters as the "furious demand,"
and describing them as very common in intellectual property litigation).
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Member Educational Campaigns

As a complement to issuing a formal ethics opinion, state and
local bar associations should undertake campaigns of their members
to educate them on the myriad of issues associated with abusive ceaseand-desist letters. These issues would include the confluence of factors
identified in this Article that create a coercive settlement process for
low-resourced targets. These types of educational campaigns are not
new since some state and local bar associations already conduct similar types of campaigns, such as those promoting "civility. '239 For example, the San Diego County Bar Association (SDCBA) has undertaken a
"Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and Professionalism," in which it
seeks to promote attorney civility inside and outside of the courtroom.2 40 To do so, it issued its own "Attorney Code of Conduct," 24 1 as
well as "Guidelines for Effective and Professional Advocacy. ' 242 One of
the SDCBA Guidelines states that " [i] n analyzing ethical dilemmas, do
not simply ask yourself if it violates any law; also ask yourself if it is fair
and if it is the right thing to do. ' 243 While this is an extremely helpful
guideline, it is only useful insofar as attorneys view being abusive in
cease-and-desist letters as an ethical dilemma. As previously discussed,
partisanship aids in blinding attorneys from recognizing their ethical
violations. 244 Additional education is needed so attorneys can recognize ethical violations in the cease-and-desist letter process, which may
245
include instruction on cognitive distortions.
3.

Outreach to Small Businesses and Individuals

Finally, additional attention by state and local bar associations
should be given to low-resourced targets of abusive cease-and-desist
239.

See, e.g., Journal News, Statewide Civility Initiative Will EncourageConversations,TENN.

BAR ASS'N (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.tba.org/jornal/statewide-civility-initiative-will-en

courage-conversations; Joseph Paul Justice Burke III, Reap What You Sow: Bar Leaders as
Cultivators of Civility, 38 BAR LEADER (Jan.-Feb. 2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publi
cations/bar leader/2013-14/january-february/ reap..whatyou sow bar leaders-as_cultiva
tors-civility.html.
240. SDCBA Campaign on Civility, Integrity, and Professionalism, SAN DIEGO CNTY.BAR
ASS'N, https://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=civility (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
241. The SDCBA Attorney Code of Conduct, SAN DIEGO CN-nr. BAR ASS'N, https://
www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?pg=attyCodeConduct (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).
242. San Diego County Bar Association Guidelinesfor Effective and ProfessionalAdvocacy, SAN
DIcEGo CNTr. BAR ASS'N, https://www.sdcba.org/SDCBA/docDownload/15452 (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
243. Id.
244. See supra Part III.A-2.a.
245. See Perlman, supra note 158, at 37-38 (suggesting that cognitive bias awareness be
included in legal education).
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letters for two different reasons. First, access to legal resources could
assist in overcoming an inability to information-gather, as well as lower
the susceptibility to inducement. While many, if not all, state and local
bar associations have pro bono programs and lawyer referral systems,
these programs appear to be available only for indigent individuals
facing personal legal issues. 246 Low-resourced targets may face threats
to their personal life, but also to their business. While there are a few
2 47
resources addressing these problems, better outreach is needed.
A few bar associations, like the Massachusetts Bar Association,
have programs like "Dial-a-Lawyer," which allows any Massachusetts
resident to call and speak to a volunteer attorney about any legal
problems or questions.2 48 The "Dial-a-Lawyer" service is offered every
first Wednesday of the month for a two-hour period, and is intended
to reach those in the community who could not otherwise access legal
advice. 249 Additional efforts like these are needed across the country,
and additional publicity needs to be given to these types of programs
so small businesses know that they do have access free or low-cost legal
advice.
Second, outreach to low-resourced entities should also educate
this population about the appropriate behavior of attorneys and disputants. Enforcement of the rules governing attorney conduct is
suboptimal due in part to ignorance of recipients of abusive ceaseand-desist letters. While a number of local bar associations have attempted to mitigate some of the unawareness through online reporting systems, 250 more can be done to educate low-resourced entities
246. See, e.g., Legal Resource Finder-Find Legal Aid, MAsSLEGALSERVICES, http://
www.masslegalservices.org/findlegalaid (last visited Mar. 15, 2015) (listing broad categories covering personal legal issues for which it provides assistance).
247. Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts is one organization that assists artists and cultural
organizations. See, e.g., Volunteer Lawyers for theArts, ARTS & Bus. COUNCIL OF GREATER Bos.,
littp://www.artsandbusinesscouncil.org/programs/volunteer-lawyers-for-the-arts.html (last
visited Mar. 15, 2015). In addition, law school clinics that focus on small business needs are
a recently developed avenue of assistance for low-resourced targets. See, e.g., Intellectual
Property & Entrepreneurship Clinic, SUFFOLK UNIV. LAW SCH., http://www.suffolk.edtI/law/
academics/clinics/21858.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); USC Small Business Clinic, USC
(last visited
GOULD SCH. OF LAw, http://lawweb.usc.edu/why/academics/clinics/sbc/
Mar. 15, 2015).
248. Dial-A-Lawyer Offers Free Legal Advice Each Month, MASS. BAR ASS'N, http://
www.massbar.org/for-the-public/need-a-lawyer/dial-a-lawyer (last visited Mar. 15, 2015).

249.

Id.

250. See, e.g., FAQs-. How Do I File a Complaint Against an Attorney?, MAss. BAR AS'N,
http://www.massbar.org/for-the-public/faqs#1 3749 (last visited Mar. 15, 2015); LawyerRegulation, CAL. STATE BAR, supra note 165.
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and the general public about ethical attorney behavior and methods
25
of reporting unethical behavior.

1

C.

More Aggressive Action by the FTC and State Attorneys
General

While the two proposals above attempt to attack the problem of
abusive letters from the sender side by altering the incentives to send
an abusive letter, and from the target side by assisting in overcoming
two characteristics creating a coercive settlement environment, the
third characteristic-the inability to follow through with litigation-is
not necessarily mitigated. One additional proposal to address this
characteristic is to enlist the aid of the state attorneys general offices
and the FTC. The state attorneys general and the FTC have attempted
to utilize consumer protection law to stop abusive cease-and-desist letters from being sent to low-resourced targets. 252 However, currently,
such actions have been limited to exceptional situations involving a
large volume of letters and deceptive letter senders. 25 3 Attributing to
this limited applicability may be the fact that the typical abusive ceaseand-desist letter does not neatly fit within the regulations of consumer
protection law, particularly where the letter is not deceptive. 254 How-

ever, in a statement before a House of Representatives hearing on a
current anti-patent troll bill, a representative for the FTC stated that
the Commission believed it had the authority to enforce in this area,
and the FTC was defending itself in a lawsuit by MPHJ Technology
255
challenging its authority.
Another reason for the lack of widespread enforcement efforts
may be the state attorneys general offices and the FTC's lack of resources. As the enforcement agency for consumer protection laws,
state attorneys general offices and the FTC enforce a range of different laws, and not just those pertaining to unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 256 With budget crunches at state attorneys general offices
251. See, e.g., What Can I Do If I Have a Problem with My Lawyer, CAL.. STATE BAR, http://
calbar.ca.gov/Public/Pamphlets/ProblemwithaLawyer.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2015)
(providing additional information educating the public about ethical attorney behavior).
252. See supra Part III.D.
253. See id.
254. See id. Some policymakers believe that this area should be subject to FTC enforcement. See Baluch, supra note 190, at 17-20 (discussing the different methods that members
of Congress presented attempting to allow the FFC to more directly regulate abusive demand letters).
255. See Statement of Lois Greisman, supra note 194.
256. See Enforcement, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement (last visited
Mar. 15, 2015).
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across the nation, an issue needs to be a top priority in order to allocate funding, otherwise only the most egregious cases will likely be
25 7
investigated.
Despite resource constraints, the FTC or state attorneys general
could alternatively promulgate rules to combat abusive cease-and-desist letters. For example, the FTC obtains its authority to promulgate
rules regarding unfair or deceptive trade practices from the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 258 As part of this rule-making power, the FTC

has promulgated specific rules relating to abusive practices, such as
creditor letters, and requires specific disclosures to be made to consumers regarding loans. 2 59 A similar identification of abusive cease-

and-desist letters as an unfair business practice, and perhaps requiring
disclosures, could be promulgated through its rule-making authority.
While this would not increase the resources that the offices have to
enforce their rules, and thereby not necessarily assist in overcoming
the inability to follow through with litigation, it could provide a deterrent effect to potential senders of abusive letters.
V.

Criticisms of Policing Cease-and-Desist Letters

Although the proposals in Part IV attempt to police abusive ceaseand-desist letters, a number of potential downsides may detract from
the urge to regulate this area of the law. Three main criticisms of such
regulation are (1) the potential for encouraging litigiousness, (2) the
potential for increasing the costs of enforcement for small businesses
and individuals, and (3) over-regulating private dispute resolution.
257. See, e.g., Timothy B. Wheeler, State Trying to Cope with Backlog of Pollution on Violation Cases, BALT. SUN (Nov. 29, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-29/features/bs-gr-enforce-20111123_lbacklog-violations-enforcement
("And with the state's
budget crunch, MDE has been unable to get funds for more positions, so the attorney
general's office could not hire more lawyers to handle the jump in cases .... "); Pamela
Prah, Texas Saves Big Money Through Effective Child Support Enforcement, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2011/09/21 /texas-saves-big-money-through-effective-child-support-enforcement
("On top of the state budget crunch, federal stimulus dollars for child support have run
out. Overall, the attorney general's office says it will have $110 million less in federal and
state money for child support enforcement over the next two years than in the previous
biennium."); Christopher Wills, Illinois Attorney General Pushes Back on Budget, ST. J. REG.
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20120308/News/303089888 ("[Illinois Attorney General] is pushing back against the governor's call for deeper budget cuts, saying her
office's ability to generate money for tax payers is already being threatened by low pay and
low morale that make it hard to retain her top lawyers.").
258. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (2012).
259. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (current through Mar. 12, 2015) (requiring lenders to inform cosigners about the nature of his or her liability).
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Potentially Encouraging Litigiousness

This Article acknowledges that implementing an anti-abusive
threats law could encourage an additional level of litigiousness. 260 By
providing targets of abusive cease-and-desist letters with a private
cause of action, some targets may decide to unreasonably or frivolously interpret "abuse." Additionally, some targets may unreasonably
view any cease-and-desist letter as abusive. 261 While this is a valid concern, it could be overcome by tailoring the new law in such a way to
discourage frivolous abusive threats actions. One way to do this could
be through a two-way fee shifting provision. Thus, whichever party
loses the suit bears the burden of the attorneys' fees for the other
party. Such could deter the filing of frivolous complaints by adding a
potential cost to the litigation.2 62 An example of such a mandatory
two-way fee shifting provision is seen in California's anti-SLAPP law. 263

Although there are reported cases where targets of cease-and-desist letters sue the sender, 264 there is currently no outcry over frivolous
lawsuits.

265

In fact, in some jurisdictions, such as in the United King-

dom, the opposite is true-legal advisers feel curtailed to send demand letters due to the potential for a lawsuit, but do not complain
260. This is a concern of the United Kingdom, which recently undertook a review of
their "groundless threats" law. See generally U.K. LAw COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER No.
212: PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: GROUNDLESS THREATS (2013)

[hereinafter

U.K LAw COMM'N: CONSULTATION PAPER].

261.

See U.K. LAw COMM'N, PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: GROUNDLESS

THREATS 77 (Apr. 2014), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/Ic346_pat
ents.groundless-threats.pdf [hereinafter U.K. LAw COMM'N: REPORT] ("The difference between 'mere notification' and a threat is in the eye of the receiver ....").
262.

But seeSUSANNE DI PIETRO, TERESA W. CARNS & PAMELA KELLEY, ALASKA JUDICIAL

COUNCIL, ALASKA'S ENGI.ISH RULE: ATTORNEY'S FEE SHIFTING IN CIVIL CASES ES-12-13 (Oct.

1995), available at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfeeexec.pdf (noting that the effect of fee shifting provisions can be mixed and there is no empirical evidence to prove
that it does discourage frivolous litigation); Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An
Empirical Study of the Impact of Alaska's English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 AL.AsKA L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (2012).

263. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West 2015) ("[A] prevailing defendant on a
special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs. If
the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause
unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff
prevailing on the motion ....

").

264. One recent example from Australia is Bell v. Steele, where the plaintiff (the target
of the cease-and-desist letter) won and was awarded $147,000. Mary Still & Jessica Cowell,
One Good Reason to Take Care Before Threatening Legal Action in Copyright Disputes, CLAY'tON
UTZ (Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/edition/29_march_2012/
20120329/onegood_reason totake care before-threateninglegal-action-in-copyright
_disputes.page.
265. It is difficult to prove a negative, and there are no direct statistics on this.
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about being overly sued. 266 This evidence suggests that introducing an
appropriately tailored, abusive threats action should not cause a drastic increase in litigation.
B.

Increasing Enforcement Costs for Small Businesses and
Individuals

Another serious concern with respect to the proposed abusive
threats cause of action is that it could harm small businesses and individuals attempting to enforce their legal rights. If a small business or
individual tries to enforce their legal rights by sending a cease-anddesist letter without the aid of an attorney, they could be subject to an
abusive threats lawsuit. This criticism has merit and would force some
small businesses and individuals to forgo enforcement altogether. 267
The inability to enforce certain legal rights, such as intellectual property rights, is an argument that is used by some patent trolls as a benefit to having non-practicing entities. 268 Patent trolls advocate that with
an aggregation of patents and resources, the entity (not the small business or individual patent owner) can enforce rights that would other269
wise be practically unenforceable.
However, this Article maintains that the current legal environment is such that small businesses and individuals already lack the
ability to fully enforce their legal rights without additional assis266. See U.K. LAw COMM'N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 35 (reporting that some legal
advisers may be reluctant to put their name to a letter).
267. Taken to the ultimate extreme, a lack of any enforcement by an intellectual property rights holder could mean a loss of the intellectual property right. See, e.g., 6J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:12 (4th ed. 2014)
("Laches is a good defense if plaintiffs long failure to exercise its legal rights has caused
the defendant to rely to its detriment by building up a valuable business around its trademark."). While this is a rare scenario, it is an argument often used by those who would
advocate against reform in this area.
268. See, e.g., Matt Levy, Three Myths About Intellectual Ventures, PATENT PROGRESS (Sept.
17, 2013), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/09/17/three-myths-intellectual-ventures/
(reporting that it is a myth that Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll, helps small inventors).
269. See Mhen Patents Attack, NPR (July 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/
2011/07/26/138576167/when-patents-attack (quoting Joe Chernesky, a vice-president at
Intellectual Ventures) ("The neat thing about Chris is he had no idea how to get money
for his patents. He had this great idea. These patents were immensely valuable because
every technology company was adopting the technology. Yet he didn't know how to get
paid. He eventually found Intellectual Ventures. So we bought those patents."). But see
Mike Masnick, This American LfeFollowup on Patents Reveals Intellectual Ventures is Even Slimier
Than Previously Believed, TECHDIRT (June 3, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20130603/112 9 5 02 3 2 9 7 /this-american-life-followup-patents-reveals-intellectual-ventures-iseven-slimier-than-previously-believed.shtml.
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tance. 2 70 An example is the case involving Maureen Reddy, an individual inventor with a patent on a light shade design. In 2012 Reddy
pitched her patented product design idea to Lowe's Home Improvement.2 7 1 Despite her pending patent, Lowe's subsequently began selling an extremely similar design. 2 72 Reddy's circumstances were such
that she would not have been able to enforce her patent without the
free representation provided by Suffolk Law School's clinic. 273 Therefore, even though there is a chance that adding a cause of action for
abusive threats could raise the cost of enforcement for small businesses and individuals, overall the practical impact would likely be
low. For enforcement to be more accessible for this population,
greater access to low-cost or free legal assistance is needed, regardless
of an additional abusive threats action.
C.

Over-Regulating Private Dispute Resolution

A more theoretical concern with any proposal to police abusive
cease-and-desist letters is that this is merely another unnecessary intrusion into the private dispute resolution process of private individuals.
Contained within this broader distaste for additional regulation of private disputes is a valid concern that the proposed abusive threats action could stymie good faith attempts at negotiating private
settlements with alleged infringers. 274 Since one of the overarching
goals of this Article's proposals is to encourage good faith attempts at
discussion and negotiation between rights holders and targets, this
concern is important.
The experiences of other countries are instructive in assessing
any proposed regulations. The United Kingdom Law Commission's
(the "Law Commission") study of threats actions discovered that intellectual property rights holders feel thwarted when inquiring about potential infringements due to a fear of being sued for groundless
threats. 275 Although in the United Kingdom groundless threats law is
slightly different than the one proposed, the recent review by the Law
Commission suggests that the groundless threats law should be reformed to include an explicit safe harbor provision for legitimate
270. See Grinvald, supra note 15, at 654-63 (arguing that small businesses and individuals cannot and should not litigate trademark infringement claims).
271. David v. Goliath: Clinic Takes Early Victory Against Lowe's, supra note 117.
272. Id.
273. Id. (quoting Eve Brown, the clinic's director).
274.

See U.K LAw COMM'N: CONSULTATION PAPFR, supra note 260, at 91-109 (docu-

menting various problems that detract from good faith negotiation attempts).
275.

See U.K LAw COMM'N: REPORT, supra note 261, at 77.
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communications. 27 6 This safe harbor is intended to allow for freer
communications between an intellectual property rights holder and
the alleged infringer. The elements of the communications protected
by the United Kingdom's proposed safe harbor are those to (1) track
down the source of infringement; (2) prevent an infringer from raising an innocent infringer defense; or (3) open negotiations for license terms. 277 A similar explicit safe harbor could be written into the
proposed anti-abusive threats law, with elements focusing on reasonability and whether the sender was attempting to open the lines of communication between the two parties. 278 Although this Article does not
advocate any particular elements for such safe harbor, elements could
include a reasonable timeframe given to the target of the letter, and
language to encourage the target to seek the advice of legal counsel to
discuss the letter's claims.
Conclusion
The increase in sending abusive cease-and-desist letters as a
means to enforce legal rights is a nationwide phenomenon affecting
entities and individuals of all different sizes, and has implications on
private dispute resolution processes. Although this is problematic
overall, it is particularly disturbing when the targets of abusive letters
are small businesses and individuals due to the coercive negotiation
environment created. When low-resourced individuals or businesses
enter into a settlement agreement with abusive letter senders, they are
likely coerced due to their inability to information-gather, susceptibility to inducement, and an inability to finance the litigation. Therefore, such agreements should be declared void. However, due to the
inability of this population to litigate, these coerced agreements
would likely never be invalidated, and a situation of de facto enforceability of coerced agreements ensues. This Article proposes a number
of different solutions to reduce the factors that create the coercive
environment in the hopes of encouraging a good faith and more
equalized settlement processes. While there are limitations and downsides to these proposals, particularly with respect to this Article's proposed anti-abusive threats law, these solutions should be considered as
276. Id. at 78.
277. Id.
278. Safe harbors, when designed appropriately, can be effective vehicles for cutting
down on unwanted litigation. See Eric Goldman, Designing Optimal Immunities and Safe
Harbors, TECH. & MKTc. LAw BI.OcG (Apr. 15, 2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/
archives/2013/04/designing-optim-l.htm.
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467

part of an overall conversation regarding reform in the area of the
abusive over-enforcement of legal rights.

468
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